University of Wyoming College of Law

Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship
Faculty Articles

UW College of Law Faculty Scholarship

8-13-2015

The End of the Cold War: Can American Constitutionalism Survive
Victory?
Stephen Matthew Feldman
University of Wyoming College of Law, sfeldman@uwyo.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/faculty_articles

Recommended Citation
Feldman, Stephen Matthew, "The End of the Cold War: Can American Constitutionalism Survive Victory?"
(2015). Faculty Articles. 128.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/faculty_articles/128

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the UW College of Law Faculty Scholarship at Law
Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

The End of the Cold War: Can American Constitutionalism
Survive Victory?

STEPHEN M. FELDMAN*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

262
........
I. Introduction................
Judicial
Expression,
Free
II. Pluralist Democracy Evolves:
............ 268
Conservatism, and the Cold War..........
A. The Early Cold War, Free Expression, and Moral Clarity......268
B. The Flip Side of the Cold War: Liberty and Equality in an
........ 275
Emerging Consumers' Democracy...........
.......... 275
1. Civil Rights and Democracy..........
......... 282
2. Capitalism and Democracy.........
III. Democracy, Inc., and the End of the Cold War.......................297
A. The Rise of Democracy, Inc.: An Attack on Government......300
....... 314
B. The Roberts Court in Democracy, Inc............
IV. Why We Should Worry About Democracy, Inc.....................324
V. Conclusion.....................................337

Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Political
Science, University of Wyoming. I thank Scot Powe, Mark Tushnet, Howard Gillman, and Sam Kalen
for their comments on earlier drafts. Parts of this Essay are derived from papers I presented at the 2013
Yale Law School Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference and a 2013 University of Virginia
Constitutional History Conference (focused on Charles Beard's Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution). I thank the participants at both workshops for their suggestions and am especially grateful
to Vincent Blasi and Mel Urofsky for their detailed comments on my papers.

261

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2642445

262

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

I. INTRODUCTION

The nation's Cold War battle against the Soviet Union pervasively
influenced American law and society, as numerous scholars have observed.'
The Cold War, for instance, spurred the strengthening of civil rights and the
capitalist economy. 2 The federal government needed to protect civil rights,
at least symbolically, to deflect Soviet denunciations . of democracy.3
Meanwhile, the ostentatious exhibition and use of American consumer
products contrasted American economic prosperity with Soviet struggles.
Thus, during the Cold War, the government and the capitalist leaders were
bonded together in a struggle against the communist enemy.5

The

overriding desire for Cold War victory tempered potential political demands
for laissez-faire governance. 6
Despite the scholarly attention showered on the Cold War, a shockingly
small number of authors have even considered the effects of the end of the
Cold War on American law and society.7 This article takes on that task. In
fact, the end of the Cold War, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, profoundly
influenced national development.8 Most important, the nation's Cold War
victory generated unanticipated and perverse changes in American
democracy.9 The national victory unleashed corporate wealth from its Cold
War strictures.10 The government and capitalists were no longer fighting
1. Some helpful sources on the Cold War include the following: H.W. BRANDS, THE DEVIL WE
KNEW: AMERICANS AND THE COLD WAR (1993); GREG CASTILLO, COLD WAR ON THE HOME FRONT:
THE SOFT POWER OF MIDCENTURY DESIGN_(2010); RICHARD B. DAY, COLD WAR CAPITALISM: THE
VIEW FROM MOSCOW 1945-1975 (1995); MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE
IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY
(2005); MELVYN P. LEFFLER, A PREPONDERANCE OF POWER: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE TRUMAN
ADMINISTRATION, AND THE COLD WAR (1992); RICHARD SAULL, THE COLD WAR AND AFTER:
CAPITALISM, REVOLUTION AND SUPERPOWER POLITICS (2007); MARTIN WALKER, THE COLD WAR: A
HISTORY (1993).
2. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 6; see CASTILLO, supra note 1, at viii-xi.
3. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 6.
4. See CASTILLO, supranote 1, at viii-xi.
5. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
6. ROBERT L. KERR, THE CORPORATE FREE-SPEECH MOVEMENT: COGNITIVE FEUDALISM AND
THE ENDANGERED MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 32-33 (2008).
7. See DUDZIAK, supranote 1, at 15.
8. See id.

9.

See id.

10. Helpful sources discussing the development of corporations as well as globalization include
the following: see generally JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT
AND. POWER (2004); RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900 (2000); BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD
STANDARD AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION, 1919-1939 (Robert W. Fogel & Clayne L. Pope eds., 1992);
JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS FALL AND RISE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2006);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); KERMIT L. HALL & PETER
KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2d ed.2009); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
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together against a common foe." To the contrary, capitalists now seemed to
view government as its enemy.1 2 Demands for laissez-fairepolicies became
13
As a
common and overt, as did denigration of democratic government.
result, American democracy transformed into Democracy, Inc., a
government system dominated by wealthy individuals and corporations.14
The conservative justices on the Supreme Court-John Roberts,
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Anthony Kennedyhave stamped Democracy, Inc., with a constitutional imprimatur." In a
wide variety of cases, the Court has promoted business, especially corporate
business, and protected the economic marketplace from government
regulation." In fact, under the approving eye of the Robert's Court, the
private sphere has become so bloated with power that it has, in effect,

CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN
WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003); KENICHI
OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES (1996); JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); BENJAMIN R. TwIss, LAWYERS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1962); LEVIATHANS:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW GLOBAL HISTORY (Alfred D Chandler, Jr. & Bruce

Mazlish eds., 2005) [hereinafter LEVIATHANS]; Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the
American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. (1945); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical
Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593 (1988) [hereinafter The Classical
Corporation in American Legal Thought]; Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American
Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 51 (1993); Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing

Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875-1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631 (1978).

Helpful sources

discussing economic development in general (or in the United States) include the following: see
generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY AND OTHER WRITINGS 1952-1967:
AMERICAN CAPITALISM, THE GREAT CRASH, 1929, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL
STATE (James K. Galbraith ed., 2010); ROBERT HEILBRONER & WILLIAM MILBERG, THE MAKING OF
ECONOMIC SOCIETY (Leah Jewell et al. ed., 10th ed. 1998); ROBERT HEILBRONER & AARON SINGER,
THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA: 1600 TO THE PRESENT, (David Tatom et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1999); RONALD E. SEAVOY, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 1607 TO THE
PRESENT (2006).
11. See KERR, supra note 6, at 32.
12. Helpful sources on the relationship between democracy and capitalism include the following:
see generally FRED BLOCK & MARGARET R. SOMERS, THE POWER OF MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM:
KARL POLANYI'S CRITIQUE (2014); TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY: MONEY IN
POLITICS AND THE FREE MARKET CONSTITUTION (2014); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014); DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX:
DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P.
TOMAIN, ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE REGULATION (2014); JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2013).
13. See KERR, supra note 6, at 32-35.
14. DEMOCRACY INCORPORATED is the title of a book by Sheldon S. Wolin, SHELDON S. WOLIN,
AND THE SPECTER OF INVERTED
INCORPORATED: MANAGED DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRACY
TOTALITARIANISM xi (2008), while DEMOCRACY, INC., is the title of a book by David S. Allen. DAVID
S. ALLEN, DEMOCRACY, INC.: THE PRESS AND LAW IN THE CORPORATE RATIONALIZATION OF THE
PUBLIC SPHERE 1, 12 (2005).
15. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 317-19 (2010); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.
Ct. 1434, 1440-42 (2014).

16. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 351,372; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462.
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subsumed the public sphere." If Democracy, Inc., continues unchecked, it
will threaten the constitutional system, including both American democracy
and American capitalism. I
A brief summary of the history of American democracy will set the
stage for this focus on the Cold War, its end, and the threat of Democracy,
Inc.1 9 From the founding until the early twentieth century, the nation
Under republican
operated as a republican democratic regime.2 0
democracy, citizens and elected officials were supposed to be virtuous; in
the political realm, they were to pursue the common good or public welfare
rather than their own partial or private interests. 2 1 When citizens or officials
used government institutions to pursue their own interests, then the
government was corrupt. 2 2 Ultimately, the constitutional framers sought
balance between government power and individual rights, particularly
property rights.23 They sought to enhance the protection of property rights,
but they simultaneously empowered government to act for the common
good.24
Republican democracy persisted in the rural, agrarian, and relatively
homogeneous American society of the nineteenth century.25 - A variety of
forces, however, strained the regime in the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries. 2 6
These forces, including industrialization,
urbanization, and immigration, eventually led, in the 1930s, to the collapse

17.

See Corey Ciocchetti, The Constitution, the Roberts Court, and Business: The Significant

Business Impact ofthe 2011-2012 Supreme Court Term, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 385, 404 (2013).
18. See generally Stephen M. Feldman, The Interpretation of ConstitutionalHistory, or Charles
Beard Becomes a Fortuneteller (With an Emphasis on Free Expression), 29 CONST. COMMENT. 323

(2014).
19. For a more comprehensive history of American democracy in relation to free expression, see
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 466 (2008)
[hereinafter FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA].
20. See FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA , supra note 19, at 14-45, 153-208.
21. E.g., Virginia Bill of Rights (1776), reprinted in BEN PERLEY POORE, THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
PART II 1908-09 (2d ed. 1878) (emphasizing government for "the common benefit"); see GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 59 (1969) (discussing republican
government). Other sources on the framing include the following: see generally RICHARD BEEMAN,
PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2009); FORREST MCDONALD,
Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985); JENNIFER
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990). For the most complete record of the constitutional
convention, see generally THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) [hereinafter THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787]. All citations to The
Federalistare to the Project Gutenberg E-text of The FederalistPapers.
22. See FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 19, at 16.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id at 21.
Id. at 22.
See id at 170.
Id. at 187.
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27
of the republican democratic regime and the rise of pluralist democracy.
Mainstream and old-stock Protestant values, long the foundation for the
republican democratic principles of virtue and the common good, were now
to be balanced with the values of other Americans who constituted the
demographically diverse population.2 8 Thus, the key to pluralist democracy
lay not in the specification of supposedly objective goals, such as the
common good, but rather in the following of processes that allowed all
citizens to voice their particular values and interests within a free and open
democratic arena. 29 Pluralist democracy, in other words, is grounded on
value (or ethical) relativism: No single set of values or interests is inherently
predominant. 30 Numerous political and constitutional theorists celebrated
pluralist democracy as the best means for accommodating "our multi-group
society." 31 The only way to determine public values and goals, they
32
By
explained, is "through the free competition of interest groups."

"composing or compromising" their different values and interests,

33

the

''competing groups [would] coordinate their aims in programs they can all
Legislative decisions therefore turned on negotiation,
support."34
persuasion, and the exertion of pressure through the normal channels of the
35
democratic process.

Many scholars and jurists emphasized that free expression was a
prerequisite to the pluralist democratic process. 3 6 According to this selfgovernance rationale for protecting free speech and writing, free expression
allows diverse groups and individuals to contribute their views in the
pluralist political arena. 37 Indeed, no liberty or right-not even voting 7-is
more crucial to the pluralist democratic process than free expression. 3 8 If
government officials interfere with the pluralist process by controlling
public debates, then they skew the democratic outcomes and undermine the

27.

See FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supranote 19, at 187.

28. Id. at 180.
29.

JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 176 (1939).

30. Claude J. Burtenshaw, The Political Theory of PluralistDemocracy, 21 W. POL. Q. 577, 585
(1968).
31. WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOs, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 9 (1949).

32. Id.
3 3. Id.
34. Id. at 8.
35. See id. at 10. Robert Dahl has presented, perhaps, the most comprehensive explanations of the
democratic process: see generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989); ROBERT A.
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY].
36. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT, 24-26 (1948).

37. Id.
38. Id.
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consent of the governed. 3 9 Thus, in the late 1930s and 1940s, the justices
began to uphold one free speech claim after another, a stark-about face from
the Court's consistent repudiation of First Amendment claims during the
40
republican democratic era.
This article picks up the story of pluralist democracy during the postWorld War II era. After emerging in the 1930s, pluralist democracy would
continue to evolve.41 It retained its basic principles but changed in its
details and applications. 42 The post-war evolution of pluralist democracy
intertwined closely with the development of political conservatism,
particularly as it unfolded in jurisprudence and judicial decision making. 43
After the war, two primary strands of American political conservatism
emerged: traditionalism and libertarianism." Traditionalists reacted, in
particular, against the pluralist democratic commitment to ethical
relativism. 45 Whereas liberals increasingly celebrated the diverse values
and interests roiling through a multicultural America, traditionalists
emphasized moral clarity: a need to specify and cultivate the traditional
values that had made America exceptional. 4 6 Meanwhile, libertarians
reacted against the expanding power of the national government. Thus,
liberals might advocate to continue and to strengthen New Deal (and
subsequently, Great Society) social programs, but libertarians maintained
that government power diminished individual liberty and dignity. 47

From

the libertarian standpoint, individual liberty was the root source of
American vitality, creativity, and power.4 8 One important manifestation of
libertarianism was neoliberalism, which emphasize economic liberty and
drew partly from classical liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith. 4 9 Early
neoliberal thought began to emerge even before World War II, and at that

39. Id. at 26.
40. E.g., Thornhill v. Ala., 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (holding that labor picketing is protected free
speech); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (invalidating conviction for distributing
handbills); Hague v. Comm. for Indus.Org., 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (upholding right of unions to
organize in streets).
41. See KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES:
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 112-17 (2004).

DISCONTINUITIES

IN

THE

42. See id
43. See id.
44. See PETER BERKOWITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM: LIBERTY, SELF-GOVERNMENT,
AND POLITICAL MEDERATION 9 (2013); GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1945 1-83 (2008).
45. NASH, supranote 44, at 40.
46. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 44, at 9-10.

47. NASH, supranote 44, at 57, 78-82.
48. See VARIETIES OF CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA xvii-xviii (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2004).
49. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 20 (2005); DANIEL STEDMAN
JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS I1,
101-02 (2012); e.g., F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 17 (1944).
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50
But after the
stage, it accepted government intervention in the market.
assertively
more
war, neoliberalism transformed, rapidly becoming
5
libertarian and anti-government. ' Traditionalism (now, sometimes called
social conservatism) and libertarianism united loosely in their opposition to
52
Nevertheless, traditionalism, with its
liberalism and pluralist democracy.
with its emphasis on
libertarianism,
and
emphasis on moral clarity,
53
situations.
numerous
in
individual liberty, inevitably clashed
Quite simply, the promotion of specific moral values sometimes
decreased the degree of individual freedom, and vice versa.54 To be sure,
some conservatives, including prominent neoconservatives, attempted to
harmonize these conflicting goals for the sake of political advantage.
5
Ultimately, though, such harmonizing was tenuous and fortuitous. ' In
many, if not most circumstances, traditionalism and libertarianism push in
opposite directions."
Part II of this article focuses on two interrelated factors that contributed
significantly to the evolution: the Cold War and the consumer culture.
This part also explains how interpretations of free speech-particularly,
conservative interpretations-shifted over time, partly because of the
Part III begins by exploring how the end
changes in pluralist democracy.
of the Cold War contributed to the further evolution of pluralist democracy
into Democracy, Inc.60 Part III next focuses on the Robert's Court and its
endorsement of Democracy, Inc. 6 1 Emphasis is placed on Citizens Unitedv.
63
Pursuant to these First
Federal Election Commission62 and its progeny.
Amendment decisions, corporations and other wealthy entities, including
individuals, can spend astronomical (unlimited) sums of money to influence

50. JONES, supra note 49, at 100.
51. See id. at 6-10 (summarizing the stages of neoliberalism).
52. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 44, at 9 (referring to traditionalists as the "forebears" of social
conservatives).
53. See NASH, supra note 44, at 197-98, 236.
54. See BERKOWITZ, supranote 44, at 9.
55. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT: LAW,
POWER, AND DEMOCRACY 3-4, 52 (2013) [hereinafter NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICS AND THE SUPREME
COURT]; MURRAY FRIEDMAN, THE NEOCONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION: JEWISH INTELLECTUALS AND THE
SHAPING OF PUBLIC POLICY 183 (2005) [hereinafter THE NEOCONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION]
56. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 44, at 9.
57. George H. Nash, The Uneasy Future of American Conservatism, in THE FUTURE OF
CONSERVATISM 1-20 (Charles W. Dunn ed., 2007 [hereinafter The Uneasy Future of American
Conservatism].
58. See infra Part II.B.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part Il.A.
See infra Part IlI.B.
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1438, 1441, 1462.
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Part IV explains why

Democracy, Inc., threatens our constitutional system. 65
concludes.6 6

Part V briefly

II. PLURALIST DEMOCRACY EVOLVES: FREE EXPRESSION,
JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM, AND THE COLD WAR
A. The Early-Cold War, FreeExpression, andMoral Clarity
By the late 1930s, with pluralist democracy firmly entrenched, a broadbased coalition had emerged to support the protection of civil liberties. 6 7
Many political conservatives reacted to the expanding power of the national
government by aligning themselves with this coalition. 6 8 Conservatives
recognized that if the government, now seemingly controlled by diverse
political outsiders, was reaching into new realms, especially of economic
activity, then the courts and civil liberties might usefully shield them from
government control. 69 In 1938, the president-elect of the American Bar
Association reminded lawyers that civil liberties protect the "wealthy and
privileged," 7 0 while renowned corporate lawyer, Grenville Clark,
encouraged "conservatives" to be "intelligent, enlightened guardians of ...
civil rights." 7 This conservative backing for civil liberties bolstered the
transformation of free speech into a constitutional lodestar. 72
But conservative support for civil liberties was brief. Pressure to
suppress speech and writing increased during World War II and the Cold
War, and led to the unraveling of the broad civil-liberties coalition.73
During the 1940s and 1950s, conservatives frequently reasoned that
government interests outweighed free-expression interests and thus justified
suppression. 74 For instance, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,7
decided in 1940, with war looming, the Court upheld mandatory flag
salutes. 76 A Pennsylvania school board required teachers and students to

64.

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462.

65.
66.
67.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See KERSCH, supra note 41, at 112.

68.
69.

Seeid.atll2-17.
Seeid at 112.

70.

RICHARD W. STEELE, FREE SPEECH IN THE GOOD WAR 11 (1999).

71.

Grenville Clark, Conservatism and Civil Liberty, XXIV A.B.A. J. 640, 644 (1938) (address

delivered at annual meeting of Nassau County Bar Association on June I1, 1938).

72.

See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943).

73.

See FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 19, at 430-31.

74. See id. at 430.
75. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruledby Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
76. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600.
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7
When the Gobitis
salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance.
children, aged twelve and ten, refused to participate in the daily ceremony,
the school expelled them. 78 The Gobitis family argued that the school board
had violated the children's rights to free exercise of religion and free
expressioth. 79 The Court concluded, though, that a societal interest in unity
80
and security outweighed both First Amendment rights.
The Court would soon overrule itself on the issue of mandatory flag
salutes in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,si
emphasizing that free speech is a constitutional lodestar and that democracy
cannot exist without it. 82 Yet, the onset of the Cold War immediately
For
following World War II triggered strong impulses to suppress dissent.
many Americans, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union presented a moral choice between freedom and democracy, on the
84
one side, and tyranny and communism, on the other. In a speech delivered
on March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman announced that the United
85
He
States would aid democratic nations resisting communist takeovers.
justified this policy, which would become known as the Truman Doctrine,
in stark moral terms:

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must
choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not
a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority,
and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government,
free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech
and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second
way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed
upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled
press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal
freedoms.86
From this perspective, any dissent to American principles and policies
amounted to an immoral betrayal of the nation's interests and the American
77. Id. at 591.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 592-93.
80. Id. at 593-96.
81. 319 U.S. 624.
82. Id. at 640-42.
83. See Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 385-86 (1950); Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of
City ofN.Y., 342 U.S. 485, 486-87 (1952); Dennis v United States, 341 U.S. 494, 495-96 (1951).
84. See GADDIS, supra note 1, at 98-102. In the 1980's, President Ronald Reagan would still be
casting the Cold War in moral terms, as he referred to the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Id. at 224-25.
85. See DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 704-06 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 6th ed.

1958).
86.

Id. at 705.
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way of life. 8 7 By executive order, the President established a loyalty
program for all federal employees. 88 Under this program, "[m]embership
in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic
organization . . . designated by the Attorney General as . . . Communist, or
subversive" constituted disloyalty that would disqualify the individual from
federal employment.89 Loyalty investigations were means for enforcing
traditional American values, including certain less savory norms such as
racism and anti-intellectualism. 90 For example, loyalty review boards
would ask: "Have you ever had Negroes in your homes?" 9 1 Alternatively,
they might ask: "Do you read Howard Fast? Tom Paine? Upton Sinclair?" 9 2
One review board member explained: "Of course the fact that a person
believes in racial equality doesn't prove that he's a communist, but it
certainly makes you look twice, doesn't it?" 93
Despite such executive actions, red baiters, such as Republicans Joseph
McCarthy and Richard Nixon, persistently attacked Truman and the
Democrats as being too soft on communism. 94 In 1947, a Republicancontrolled Congress overrode Truman's veto and enacted the Taft-Hartley
Act.95 Apart from its general anti-union purposes, the Taft-Hartley Act
required each union officer to sign an affidavit declaring that "he is not a
member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party . . . .96
Refusal to sign would preclude a union from invoking National Labor
Relations Act protections and procedures.
In American Communications
Association v. Douds,98 decided in 1950, the Supreme Court upheld this
affidavit requirement in the face of a First Amendment challenge. 99 Chief
87. See id.
88. See DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 85, at 707-10
89. Id. at 710 (emphasis omitted). Commager dates Truman's executive order on March 22,
1947, but the government archives date it on March 21, 1947. Id. at 707; Executive OrdersDisposition
Tables: Harry S. Truman, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-

orders/1 947.html> (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
90.

See ROBERT J. GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO

1976 302-04 (2001).
91. Id. at 303.
92. Id.
93. Id at 304; see GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 345-46 (2004) (discussing Truman's loyalty

hearings).
94.

See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Age of McCarthy: A CautionaryTale, 93 CALIF. L.

REv. 1387, 1388-89, 1393-96 (2005) [hereinafter Free Speech in the Age ofMcCarthy].
95. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 85, at 716-19; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note
90, at 290-91; ERIK W. AUSTIN, POLITICAL FACTS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1789 50, 52-53, 55
(1986) (depicting Republican control of the United States House of Representatives and the United States

Senate in 1947).
96.

DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 85, at 718.

97. Id.
98. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
99. Douds, 339 U.S. at 386, 389, 411-12, 415.
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Justice Vinson's majority opinion stressed the specific government interest
(or legislative purpose) behind the statute. 0 0 Congress had sought to
protect the free flow of interstate commerce from what Communists "have
done and are likely to do again[,]" namely, call political strikes-labor
10 1
strikes called to advance political rather than union-employee goals.
Thus, Vinson reasoned that Congress had imposed the Taft-Hartley affidavit
requirement in order to restrict harmful conduct, rather than to restrict
unpopular expression.02 Even so, the Court acknowledged that the
statutory restriction might interfere with the expression of ideas by
Communists.103 Vinson therefore proceeded to balance the government
04
interests against the infringement of First Amendment freedoms.1
Concluding that the government interests predominated, the Court
10 5
The
emphasized that Communists remained free to express their beliefs.
officers
Communist
having
from
unions
discourage
to
statute merely sought
because, once in such a position of power, they could then call a political
06
The
strike-a dangerous possibility, particularly in a defense industry.1
First Amendment, Vinson concluded, "does not require that [a Communist]
07
be permitted to be the keeper of the arsenal."'
Conservative Republicans in Congress continued to push an antiCommunist agenda. 0 8 On September 23, 1950, Congress enacted, again
over Truman's veto, the McCarran Internal Security Act, which required all
"Communist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations to register with
09
the Attorney General, who then was required to publish the registrants.'
The Act further mandated that the Communist organizations divulge the
names of their officers and the sources of their funds; Communist-action
organizations also needed to identify their members."o Meanwhile, the
House Committee on Un-American Activities ("HUAC") investigated not
only Hollywood insiders, most notoriously, but also doctors, lawyers,

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id at 390-91, 393.
Id. at 387, 396.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 399.
Douds, 399 U.S. at 399.
Id. at 402-04.
Id at 412.

107. Id. For a discussion of whether Communists truly threatened to weaken the nation's defenses
by calling political strikes, see MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND
THE MCCARTHY ERA 29-31 (2005); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN
AMERICA 183-90 (1998). The scholarly consensus is that political strikes did occur, but they were far
less common and serious than the government claimed. REDISH, supranote 107, at 31.
108. See infra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.

109. Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, §§ 7(a)-(b), 9(a)(1)-(2), (d), 64 Stat. 987, 993,
995-96.
110. § 7(d)(2)-(3), 64 Stat. at 993-94; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 90, at 322.
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musicians, and others.'
Thousands of reputations and careers were
destroyed.1 12 State legislatures, along with HUAC, investigated Communist
influences in the public schools.' Local school boards were apt to fire any
teacher subject to an investigation, regardless of the result.1 14 States also
imposed loyalty oaths to bar teachers who supposedly had Communist
affiliations.' 15 In Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York,' 1 6
decided in 1952, the Supreme Court upheld a New York law that compelled
teachers to sign affidavits swearing they did not belong to subversive
organizations. 1 7 The Court reasoned that each individual had a right to free
expression but not a right to be a public school teacher.118 The fear was that
individuals with Communist affiliations were morally unfit to teach the
young.119 Ultimately, hundreds of schoolteachers, as well as hundreds of
college professors, lost their jobs "because of their actual or suspected, past
or present, membership in the Communist Party." 1 2 0
Dennis v. United States'2 1 might be the most renowned Supreme Court
anti-Communist decision of the post-World War II period.1 22 By a six-totwo vote, Dennis upheld the convictions of eleven leaders of the Communist
Party of the United States (CPUSA) for advocating the violent overthrow of
the government.123 Even though the prosecution only proved that the
defendants taught Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Chief Justice Fred Vinson's
plurality opinion reasoned that the advocated evil-the violent overthrow of
the government-was so grave as to outweigh any First Amendment
concerns.1 24 The Court's decision in Dennis started a "chain-reaction

111.

See Kalah Auchincloss, Note, CongressionalInvestigations and the Role ofPrivilege, 43 AM.

CRIM. L. REv. 165, 175-76 (2006); Alan I. Bigel, The FirstAmendment and National Security: The
Court Responds to Governmental Harassment of Alleged Communist Sympathizers, 19 OHIO N.U. L.

REV 885, 914 (1993).
112. See Jos6 Felip6 Anderson, Freedom ofAssociation, the Communist Party, and the Hollywood
Ten: The Forgotten First Amendment Legacy of Charles Hamilton Houston, 40 MCGEORGE L. REv. 25,

28 (2009).
113. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW

§ 3022

(Consol. 1949) (repealed 1958).

114. See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlett Letters: The Tension Between Privacy

and Disclosurein ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1991).
115. See Bigel, supra note 111, at 914.
116. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
117. Id. at 496.
118. Id. at 493.
119. JAIES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974 185 (1996).
At the university level, the presidents of Harvard and Columbia concluded a 1949 panel by stating,
"Communists were 'unfit' to teach." Id.
120. STONE, supranote 93, at 422.

121. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
122.

See infra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.

123. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497, 516-17. The defendants were also convicted for conspiring to
organize the CPUSA. Id. at 497.
124. Id. at 508-l1.
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process,"l 2 5 which led to the arrest and prosecution of dozens of additional
CPUSA members.' 2 6 The irony of this Red Scare era was that the nation,
with the Court's approval, vigorously suppressed free expression for the
overarching purpose of protecting the American way of life and traditional
values.1 2 7 In Adler, the Court explicitly found that the Legislature sought to
protect "truth [and] free inquiry" in the public schools.1 2 8 To maintain such
free inquiry, the government must "screen the officials, teachers, and
employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools . . . .129
From this perspective, free inquiry depended on moral clarity.' 30 The
morally unfit necessarily undermined free and open discussion and,
therefore, must be suppressed.1 3 1
The nation sought to proclaim its traditional values-those that
distinguished the United States from the Soviet Union-in other overt
ways. 132 For instance, in 1954, Congress amended the law specifying the
words of the Pledge of Allegiance to include the phrase, "under God." 33
The legislative history underscored the congressional purpose: "to
distinguish the American system of government from communism and to
underscore the commitment to inalienable, individual rights guaranteed by
God." 34 In 1956, Congress officially declared "In God We Trust" the
national motto.' 3 5 For many Americans, religious values seemed central to

.

In upholding the constitutionality of a released-time
democracy.1 36
programpermitting students to be released early from public school for the
purpose of receiving religious instruction, the Court stated: "We are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being . . .
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it
follows the best of our traditions." 3 7 In his book, Protestant-Catholic-Jew,
125.

Editorial, The Shape of Things, THE NATION, Jan. 31, 1953, at 89.

126.

See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 90, at 332-33; PATTERSON, supra note 119, at 193.

127. See, e.g., Douds, 339 U.S. at 399; Adler, 342 U.S. at 510-11 (Douglas, dissenting); Dennis,
341 U.S. at 580-81 (Black, dissenting).
128. Adler, 342 U.S. at 489-90.
129. Id. at 493.
130. See id
131. See id.
132.

See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.

133. Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954).
134. Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in FOUNDATION PRESS:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 471 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (citing legislative history).
135. ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 570
(1964); Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.

121, 148 (2001).
136. See WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW:
SOCIOLOGY 88 (1955).

137. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
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Will Herberg encapsulated the perception that traditional religious-cultural
morality supplied "the crucial values" for "the American Way of Life."138
According to Herberg, Protestantism, Catholicism,
and Judaism were
39
democracy."'l
of
'religions
three
"the
together
Even as the Supreme Court seemingly supported traditional values in
the Cold War, some conservative constitutional theorists remained
dissatisfied and pushed the Court to move rightward.1 40 Writing in 1957,
Walter Berns, who had studied under political philosopher Leo Strauss,1 4 1
complained that "speech of almost any character, true or false, good or bad,
enjoys a favored status before the Court," except in cases involving national
security. 14 2 The justices, continued Berns, were committed to the tenets of
pluralist democracy, including ethical relativism, and thus acted as if "all
judgments of better and worse are arbitrary."l 4 3 Berns condemned this
judicial attempt to eschew value judgments vis-A-vis the content of
expression.144 The "problem of free speech," he explained, was really "the
problem of virtue."l 4 5 In resolving free expression cases, the Court should
attempt to "promote the virtue of citizens" 46 and to pursue the "general
welfare" (that is, the common good).1 4 7 Hence, Berns recommended that
the Court return to a doctrinalequivalent of the bad tendency test, which the
Court had followed during the republican democratic era.148 The Court
must distinguish between "good and evil,"' 49 then must allow the
government to cultivate citizens of "good character,"150 while censoring the
licentious.'"' Otherwise, the United States would be unable to protect
"against dangers to civility"

52

and would no longer be a "decent society." 1 3

Subsequently, in reaction to the 1960s counterculture and social
unrest-including the anti-Vietnam War movement, the Black Power
movement, the Women's Rights movement, and so on-conservative
scholars increasingly followed a traditionalist path condemning relativism
138.
139.
American
140.
141.
142.

HERBERG,supra note 136, at 88.
Id. at 166-67. Protestants, Catholics, and Jews lived together "under the benevolent aegis of
democracy." Id.
See infra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953).
WALTER BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 70 (1957).

143.
144.
145.
146.

See id. at 26.
Id. at 250-51.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.

147.

See BERNS, supra note 142, at 255.

148. See id at 251.
149. Id. at 47, 72, 126.
150. See id. at 242, 256.
151. Id. at 26, 225.
152.

BERNS, supra note 142, at 72.

153. Id. at 70.
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and advocating for moral clarity. 15 4 Alexander Bickel worried that
democracy and civil society could not survive without "a foundation of
moral values."15 5 Bickel asserted, "[a] valueless politics and valueless
institutions are shameful and shameless and, what is more, man's nature 5is6
such that he finds them, and life with and under them, insupportable."
Bickel's friend and Yale colleague, Robert Bork, emphasized the
57
He
importance of such moral values to First Amendment jurisprudence.
argued that the justices should follow an originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation, thus sticking "close to the text and the history,
and their fair implications." 158 From Bork's perspective, the Court had
unjustifiably expanded the First Amendment protection of free
expression.1 59 "There is no basis," Bork wrote, "for judicial intervention to
protect . . . scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene
or pornographic."1 6 0 Pornography, in particular, should be "seen as a
problem of pollution of the moral and aesthetic atmosphere precisely
analogous to smoke pollution."' 6
B. The Flip Side of the Cold War: Liberty and Equality in an Emerging
Consumers'Democracy
During the early pluralist democratic era, the Cold War unquestionably
generated suppression in the ostensible service of traditional American
values, but the Cold War also had a flip side.1 6 2 Even as the nation tried to
stamp out communism, America pushed to expand liberty in the realms of
both political and economic rights. 63
1. Civil Rights and Democracy
America's long-running struggle against the Soviet Union forced the
United States, for strategic reasons, to confront some of its own
shortcomings.164 The ideal of pluralist democracy demanded that all

154. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
155.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 23 (1975).

156. Id. at 24.
157.

See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,

6, 8, 20 (1971).
158.

Id. at 8; see Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution,

1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695, 695 (1979) [hereinafter The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the
Constitution] (advocating for originalism).
159. See Bork, supra note 157, at 20-21.-

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 29.
See infra Parts II.B.1-2.
See infra Parts I1.B.1-2.

164.

See infra notes 165-185 and accompanying text.
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citizens have an equal vote and an equal voice in democratic debates. 16 5 But
particularly in the South, governments systematically denied political rights
to blacks.1 66 This denial of political rights facilitated the enactment and
enforcement of "Jim Crow" laws, which imposed legal segregation in a host
of public accommodations, including buses, schools, parks, and water
fountains.1 67 In fact, throughout the New Deal and early post-war years, the
Democratic Party often left loopholes in federal programs that, in effect,
excluded black participation. 68 These loopholes were the price paid to
white southerners to retain their support for the Democrats.169
The Cold War, however, helped undermine Jim Crow in the South.1 70
In the struggle against the Soviets, the United States sought to win the
allegiance of other nations, including emerging third-world nations, often
populated by people of color. 7' To appeal to these third-world nations, the
United States claimed that American democracy stood for liberty and
equality for all, regardless of race, color, creed, or gender. 7 2 As the Soviets
gleefully pointed out, though, such claims sounded woefully hollow when
many African Americans continued to suffer under a type of apartheid."'
Federal officials were fully cognizant that the image of democracy
presented to the world could be either a benefit or a detriment to the
nation's Cold War interests.1 74 Thus, the federal government sought to
improve the nation's image by burnishing the democratic glow, whether it
was in relation to the mistreatment of blacks in the South or the
impoverishment of a segment of the country (again, the South), another byproduct of Jim Crow.' 7 5 As early as 1947, President Truman's Committee
on Civil Rights reported that racial segregation was no longer acceptable for
reasons "of conscience, of self-interest, and of survival in a threatening
world[, o]r to put it another way, we have a moral reason, an economic
165. See MICHAEL K. BROWN, ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLORBLIND
SOCIETY 193-94 (2003).

166. Id.
167.

Jim Crow Laws, UNITED STATES HISTORY, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/hl559.html

(last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
168. See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 19-21 (2005).

169. See id.
170. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 15-16; See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. BoardofEducation and
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980); Michael J. Klarman, Brown,

Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 26-29 (1994).
171. GADDIS, supra note 1,at 123.
172. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at I1-13.
173. Id; see WALKER, supra note 1, at 162-63 (emphasizing tension between American ideals and
the oppression of African Americans).
174. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 12.
175. For links between Jim Crow and the economic underdevelopment of the South, see DUDZIAK,
supranote 1, at 79; Bell, supra note 170, at 523-25.
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In the school
reason, and an international reason" to attack segregation.
77
of
segregation cases argued in the early 1950s, Brown v. Board Education
and its companion Bolling v. Sharpe,17 8 the Justice Department filed an
79
Given
amicus curiae brief arguing that segregation was unconstitutional.'
that Bolling dealt with the segregated District of Columbia schools, the brief
80
"Foreign
emphasized the treatment of people of color in Washington.1
by their
people
our
and
country
this
officials and visitors naturally judge
of
treatment
experiences and observations in the nation's capital; and the
colored persons here is taken as the measure of our attitude toward
minorities generally."' 8 ' Thus, the brief highlighted how racial segregation,
including in the schools, contravened national interests: "The existence of
discrimination against minority groups in the United States has an adverse
effect upon our relations with other countries. Racial discrimination
furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubts
even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the
democratic faith." 8 2 When the Supreme Court followed the Justice
Department's recommendation and held that school segregation violated the
Constitution, Chief Justice Warren's unanimous opinion emphasized that
83
education was crucial for "good citizenship" in "our democratic society.'
In fact, the national government immediately used the decision to its
advantage in the Cold War.1 8 4 Within one hour after the Court announced
Brown, "the Voice of America broadcast the news to Eastern Europe . .
emphasiz[ing] that 'the issue was settled by law under democratic processes
85
rather than by mob rule or dictatorial fiat.'"
In short, the Cold War created an imperative for the United States to
champion the principles of pluralist democracy.1 86 Likewise, to defeat the
Soviets, the nation needed to temper any threat to American democracy, or

176.

To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS

139-148 (photo reprint 2004) (1947) (elaborating three reasons for change). Many white southerners
initially resisted social change even though they would ultimately benefit economically from
desegregation. GAVIN WRIGHT, SHARING THE PRIZE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 6, 259-60 (2013); Klarman, supra note 170, at 37-38, 51
(explaining how economic pressures were brought to bear in the South).

177. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
178. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
179. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), 1952 WL 82045 at *3.
180. Id. at *4-5.
181. Id. at *4.
182. Id. at *6.
183. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
184. DUDZIAK, supranote 1, at 107.

185. Id.
186. See id. 15-16.
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at least to the appearance of democracy.' 87 Thus, nonviolent civil rights
protests were acceptable-because they underscored how America could
change in accordance with the rule of law-but any protests that became too
radical or disruptive were considered subversive of national interests. 8 8
Violent protests suggested that the democratic process could not peacefully
accommodate conflicting interests and values, while a judicial decision like
Brown lent credibility to the nation's claim that the democratic rule of law
was superior to tommunism.' 89 In fact, conservative opponents of civil
rights were quick to denounce protestors as communists or communist
sympathizers, especially if they even hinted at violence.1 90 "All the
disgraceful episodes which have occurred in New York and other cities
recently were certainly not directed by patriotic American Negro leaders,"
declared the magazine, U.S. News and World Report.1 91 "The time has come
for the Government of the United States to do more to expose the
infiltration in civic movements by the Communist Party and its agents,
stooges, and allies inside this country." 9 2
Regardless, after the Court decided Brown, the pro-democracy effects
of the Cold War continued to snowball, as the nation moved toward the
fulfillment of pluralist democratic principles.' 93 President Lyndon B.
Johnson, a Southerner from Texas, proclaimed that "[i]t is wrongly-deadly
wrong-to deny any of your fellow Americans the right to vote." 94 In
1964, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment proscribed poll taxes in federal
elections, while the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA") and parts of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 eradicated literacy, educational, and character tests
that had been used to deny or discourage racial minorities from voting.195
The VRA, in particular, produced substantive change rather than mere
changes in the appearance or forms of democracy.196 For instance, the
percentage of blacks registered to vote in Mississippi catapulted from 6.7%
in 1964 to 66.5% in 1969.'"
187. Id
188. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 280-85 (2d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW]; Charles R. Lawrence 111, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go:

RegulatingRacist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 466 (1990).
189. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 249-51.
190. BRANDS, supranote 1, at 108-13.

191. Id. at 110 n.19 (quoting US. News and World Report, May4, 1964).
192. Id. at I10.
193. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 107.
194. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES 263 (2000) (quoting Johnson from 1965).

195. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1; Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301 et seq.;
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975(a)-(d), 2000(a)-2000(h)(4).
196.
197.

BROWN, supra note 165, at 194.
MANNING MARABLE, THE GREAT WELLS OF DEMOCRACY: THE MEANING OF RACE IN

AMERICAN Life 71 (2002).
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The Court, too, continued to transform pluralist democracy by
interpreting the Constitution to protect participation in the democratic
process. 19 8 In the 1960s, the Court decided many cases that explicitly
99
Gomillion
protected the democratic process and made it more inclusive.1
200
v. Lightfoot, decided in 1960, held that a state law transforming the city of
Tuskegee, Alabama, "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided
20
figure" violated the Fifteenth Amendment. 1 The state statute, which
"remov[ed] from the city all save four or five of its 400 Negro voters while
202
amounted to
not removing a single white voter or resident,"
unconstitutional gerrymandering that denied African Americans "the
203
In Baker v. Carr,204 the
municipal franchise and consequent rights."
Court overruled an earlier decision and held that an allegation of vote
dilution arising from disproportional representation, whether in a state
legislature or the House of Representatives, constituted a justiciable
206
claim. 205 Baker led to Wesberry v. Sanders, focusing on congressional
207
focusing on state legislative districts,
districts, and Reynolds v. Sims,
208
which together established the doctrine of "one person, one vote.,
Unsurprisingly, given how the self-governance rationale posits that free
expression is a prerequisite for pluralist democracy, when the Court in the
1960s invigorated its protection of the democratic process, it also energized
209
Many of the Court's most
the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.
210
Indeed, one could
speech-protective decisions came during that decade.
free expression
of
promise
the
fulfilled
Court
the
that
argue
reasonably
2
in these cases
justices
the
Repeatedly,
11
lodestar.
being a constitutional
issues in a
of
political
emphasized the need for free and open discussions
212
pluralist democratic regime.

198. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340, 346-47 (1960); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 187-88 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
2-4 (1964).
199. See, e.g., Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340, 346-47; Baker, 369 U.S. at 187-88; Reynolds, 377 U.S.
at 536-37; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 2-4.
200. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
201. Gomillion, 364 U.S.at 340.
202. Id. at 341.
203. Id. at 347.
204. 369 U.S. 186 (1962), overruling Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
205. Baker, 369 U.S. at 187-88,'197-98.
206. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
207. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
208. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18.
209. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964); Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968).
210. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574-75.
211.

THE NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 55, at 121.

212. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269-70.
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New York Times v. Sullivan,2 13 decided in 1964, asked whether the First
Amendment protected the press from civil libel actions brought by
government officials. 214 The Times had published a full-page advertisement
that solicited support for the civil rights movement while criticizing the
police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama.2 15 The advertisement,
however, contained several minor factual errors. 2 16 For instance, it stated
that students in Montgomery, Alabama had sung 'My Country, 'Tis of
Thee' on the State Capitol steps, but they had, in fact, sung the national
217
anthem.
The police commissioner successfully brought a civil action in
the state courts for defamation.2 18
The Supreme Court had previously recognized defamation as
constitutionally unprotected (or low-value) speech, yet this case resembled a
criminal prosecution for seditious libel. 2 19 The government, through the
institution of the state courts, sought to punish the press for criticizing a
public official, the police commissioner. 2 20 Reversing, a unanimous Court
emphasized the self-governance rationale. 22 1 "[W]e consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials." 22 2 After deeming
government prosecution of seditious libel unconstitutional, the Court
reasoned that if a state could not constitutionally punish criticisms of
government policies and officials through a criminal prosecution, then it
should not be able to impose punishment through a civil defamation
223
action.
Instead, a "public official" can recover "damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct" only if "he proves that
the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."224
Pickering v. Board of Education,2 2 5 decided in 1968, arose when a
school board dismissed a teacher for writing a letter to a newspaper.226 The
213. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
214. Id. at 256.
215. Id. at 256-58.
216. Id. at 258-59.
217. Id.
218. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 263.
219. Id. at 268.
220. Id. at 256-58, 264-65.
221. See id at 270-71.
222. Id. at 270.
223. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277.
224. Id at 279-80.
225. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
226. Id at 564.
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letter criticized how the board and the school superintendent had handled
funding issues. 227 The Co
Court began by emphasizing that public schools
could not force teachers, as a condition of employment, to relinquish their
free expression rights to comment on issues of public concern. 22 8 While the
state, as an employer, might have an interest in regulating for purposes of
efficiency, the First Amendment protects an employee from being
discharged for comments "on issues of public importance."2 29
One year later, the Court decided Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,230 which also involved public schools, though
in this case the schools had suspended students for wearing black armbands
in protest against the Vietnam War.231 The Court categorized the armbands
as "pure speech" rather than conduct and, therefore, as deserving of
"comprehensive protection under the First Amendment." 232Like teachers,
students do not lose their First Amendment rights merely because they enter
a school, the Court reasoned.2 33 Although students' presence in a school
environment might require some diminishment of their rights, the Court
articulated a highly speech-protective doctrine: Student expression is
constitutionally protected unless it causes "material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline."234 In concluding that the
student speech in this case was constitutionally protected, the Court
underscored that public schools are training grounds where students learn
the prerequisite skills for participation in a pluralist democracy-the skills
needed to become citizens and leaders.235
Brandenburg v. Ohio,23 6 decided the same year as Tinker, directly
confronted the issue raised in the World War I Espionage Act cases: When,
if ever, did the Constitution protect expression encouraging unlawful
conduct, particularly subversive advocacy criticizing the government? 237
Compared to the World War I decisions, the Court now dramatically
enlarged free expression guarantees.238 Under the Brandenburg test, the
First Amendment shields expression unless the speaker specifically intends
to incite imminent unlawful action, and such unlawful action is likely to

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 574.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 504.
Id. at 505-06.
Id. at 506.
Id.at5ll.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Id. at 450 (Douglas J., concurring).
Id. at 450-53.
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occur imminently. 239 In sum, in case after case-from Sullivan to Pickering
to Tinker to Brandenburg-the Court expanded the First Amendment
protection of free expression; judicial action, induced partly by the Cold
240
War, imperative to uphold pluralist democratic principles.
2. Capitalism and Democracy
The Cold War combined with other forces to contribute to the further
evolution of pluralist democracy in yet another manner.24 In particular, a
maturing mass consumer culture intertwined with the Cold War to reshape
242
In the
the economic ground underlying the pluralist democratic regime.
1920s, the development of mass consumerism had helped create a widely
shared American culture revolving around the consumption of mass
24 3
This mass
produced items and the worship of mass media celebrities.
encompassing
a
more
into
Americans
fuse
helped
consumer culture, in turn,
and less exclusionary polity that would serve as a springboard for pluralist
democracy.2 44 But the development of the mass consumer culture did not
end in the twenties.245 It continued in the 1930s and, even more so, after
World War II, as the nation emerged out of its prolonged economic
depression.246 Americans increasingly embraced mass consumerism after
the war.247 Gross national product (GNP) nearly doubled from 1945 to
1955, reaching $397.5 billion. 24 8 During those years, personal consumption
expenditures on manufactured products increased dramatically; spending on
the purchase of new and used cars alone jumped an incredible fortyfourfold.249 Significantly, the nation's prosperity empowered a growing
percentage of Americans to enjoy these consumer goods; gross disparities
of wealth diminished as the middle class grew.2 50

239. Id. at 447.
240. See supranotes 213-239 and accompanying text.
241. STUART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF
THE CONSUMER CULTURE 23-48 (1976).

242. See id.
243. Id.; FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 19, at 298-303.
244. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN
POSTWAR AMERICA 331-333 (2003).

245. Id. at 333.
246. Id. at 333-344.
247. Id at 113; see generally GARY CROSS, AN ALL-CONSUMING CENTURY: WHY
COMMERICALISM WON IN MODERN AMERICA (2000) (discussing the development of the mass-consumer
culture); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697,
700 (1993) (discussing the development of commercial advertising in the twentieth century).
248. THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
139 (1965) (Table: Gross National Product) [hereinafter STATISTICAL HISTORY].

249. Id. at 178 (Table: Personal Consumption Expenditures).
250.

WALKER, supra note 1, at 162.
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Changes in commercial advertising contributed to the further growth of
the mass consumer culture. 2 5 1 The very nature of advertising transformed
Early in the century, product
during the twentieth century.252
advertisements provided potential consumers with information that would
allow them to rationally assess the benefits of purchasing the respective
253
products.
During the 1920s, however, advertisers began to market images
and lifestyles.254 Advertisements encouraged individuals to purchase
particular products because the products symbolized certain attractive
personality traits or ways of living. 2 5 5 A particular automobile, for instance,
might be marketed as conducive to a relaxed drive in the country on a
Sunday afternoon. 2 56 Of course, advertisers continued to experiment,
questing after ever-more effective means for generating sales.2 57
Advertisements, for example, could generate previously unrecognized
anxieties-"Oh no! My underarms look sweaty!"-which only a certain
product could alleviate-"Thank goodness for my antiperspirant." 2 58
After World War II, marketing analysts realized that they could increase
sales by targeting distinct segments of the population with particularized
advertisements and products-marketing one deodorant for males and
another for females, one beer for the wealthy and another for the middle
259
class.
Such segmentation of the population for marketing purposes has,
of course, become increasingly refined. 26 0 An individual buying toothpaste
today, for instance, must decide from a dizzying array of products. 26 1 No
longer must one choose between Crest and Colgate; now one must puzzle
over special whitening toothpaste, special tartar-removing toothpaste,
special anti-cavity toothpaste, special mouthwash-striped toothpaste, special
gum-disease toothpaste, and on, and on, and on.262
Meanwhile, changes in the mass media transformed advertising. 26 3 In
the early twentieth century, advertisements were placed within the print
251.

See LYNN DUMENIL, THE MODERN TEMPER: AMERICAN CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE

1920s 86-90, 97 (Eric Foner ed., 1995).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. EWEN, supranote 241, at 25, 35-36; Collins & Skover, supra note 247, at 700, 702.
256.

DUMENIL, supra note 251, at 89.

257. Id at 89-92.
258.

Id. at 90, 96-97; Collins & Skover, supra note 247, at 703; see EWEN, supra note 241, at 35

(emphasizing the creation of"fancied need").
259. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 244, at 336-38 (discussing the use of targeted media in
presidential race).
260. See, e.g., infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
261. See Types of Toothpaste, DENTAL HEALTH FOUNDATION, http://www.dentalhealth.ie/dentalh

ealth/teeth/typesoftoothpaste.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
262. Id.
263.

See infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text
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media, primarily newspapers and magazines.264 The development of
electronic mass media-radio in the 1920s, television in the 1950s, and the
Internet in the 1990s-opened additional pathways for reaching
consumers. 2 65 Given these new venues and the evident success of
advertising as a means for increasing profits, the amount of money devoted
to commercial advertising grew astronomically. 26 6 In 1900, $542 million
was spent on advertising, and by 1929, the amount had jumped to $3,426
million.267 After World War II, advertising volumes skyrocketed: In 1949,
the amount had climbed over $5 billion, and by 1957, the amount was above
$10 billion. 268 The numbers continued their ascent: In 1990, amazingly,
almost $130 billion was spent on advertising, a figure that nearly doubled
by 2001.269
"The expanding mass-consumer culture fused with American law and
politics in multiple ways." 270 Most important, pluralist democracy became,
in effect, a consumers' democracy. 2 7 1 From its outset, pluralist democracy
had resonated with capitalist ideology because of the overlapping emphases
on the individual pursuit of self-interest. 272 Yet, during the Cold War
period, the connection between democracy and capitalism grew stronger;
"politics grew increasingly like commercial consumption."273
Citizens followed their own values and interests, whether shopping
for a product or a candidate. In the presidential campaigns of the
1950s, New York advertising agencies successfully marketed
Dwight 'Ike' Eisenhower. Then, when market analysts realized the
effectiveness of aiming advertisements at targeted population
segments, political analysts followed close behind. Thus, the John
F. Kennedy campaign marketed to distinct segments of the political
Election campaigns became
market in the 1960 election.

264. See DUMENIL, supranote 251, at 86.
265. See CROSS, supra note 247, at 100 (discussing the rapid spread of television); PAUL STARR,
THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS 327-84 (2004)

(discussing radio and television).
266. CROSS, supra note 247, at 34, 77.
267. STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 248, at 526 (Table: Volume of Advertising).
268. Id.
269. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: SECTION 27:
ACCOMMODATION, FOOD SERVICES, AND OTHER SERVICES 772 (2002) (Table No. 1253: AdvertisingEstimated Expenditures by Medium) [hereinafter ABSTRACT].
270. NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supranote 55, at 32.

271. Collins & Skover, supra note 247, at 724-25; see COHEN, supra note 244, at 113-343
(discussing the development of a consumers' republic of democracy after World War II).
272. NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supranote 55, at 32.

273. Id.
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'indistinguishable in form (and often in content) from product
marketing campaigns.' 2 74
The changing nature and role of corporations in American society
strongly contributed to this growing connection between democracy and
capitalism.

275

During

the

first decades

of the twentieth

century,

corporations often were demonized as "soulless leviathans," associated with
In 1933, Justice Brandeis referred to "giant
robber barons.276
corporations"277 as a "Frankenstein monster." 2 78 After World War II,
though, the corporate public image improved: Corporations became
increasingly associated with, and even emblematic of, American capitalism
in its Cold War battle against communism.

2 79

In the midst of the Cold War,

the connection between corporate capitalism and the United States did not
remain merely implicit; it was a weapon to be wielded openly against the
Soviets. 280 In 1959, when Vice President Richard Nixon attended a trade
show in Moscow, 2 8 1 he boasted about the opulence of the American kitchen
appliances on display, which the New York Times described as a "lavish
testimonial to abundance." 282 Nixon did not hesitate to accentuate the
differences between America and the Soviet Union. 283 "The United States
comes closest to the ideal of prosperity for all in a classless society," he
proclaimed.2 84 The variety and availability of consumer goods in the U.S.
symbolized 'our right to choose. We do not wish to have decisions made
at the top by governmental officials,' whether about [our] 'kind of house' or
[our] 'kind of ideas."' 28 5 In a similar vein, in 1955, when Will Herberg
celebrated the American Way of Life, he was referring to more than
274. Id. (quoting Collins & Skover, supra note 247, at 725); COHEN, supra note 244, at 9, 333,
336-38.
275. See KERR, supra note 6, at 7-8.
276. BAKAN, supra note 10, at 16-17; see KERR, supra note 6, at 19-21; KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH
AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERCIAN RICH 39 (2002).

277. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 566-67 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part).
278. Id.
279. KERR, supra note 6, at 31-32; THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE
FORGOTrEN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH 117 (2008). "[T]he anti- corporate ideology of
the thirties rapidly evaporated, leaving scarcely a trace." SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION:
CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 552 (Expanded ed., 2004) [hereinafter
POLITICS AND VISION].
280. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 243 (emphasizing that capitalism "was championed" during
Cold War). "The Cold War consolidated the power of capital and began the reaction against the welfare
state." WOLIN, supranote 14, at 26.
281. CASTILLO, supra note 1, at vii, ix.
282. PATTERSON, supra note 119, at 317 (quoting Times); see CASTILLO, supra note 1, at vii, ix
(discussing the American's Moscow exhibition).
283. See COHEN, supra note 244, at 126.

284. Id. (quoting Nixon).
285. Id.
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democracy.28 6 He included the products and comforts that accompanied the
American capitalist economy. 28 7 The American Way of Life "synthesizes
all that commends itself to the American as the right, the good, and the true
in actual life," he wrote. 28 8 "It embraces such seemingly incongruous
elements as sanitary plumbing and freedom of opportunity, Coca-Cola and
an intense faith in education-all felt as moral questions relating to the
proper way of life."289 In effect, American commercial products had
become "icons of anticommunism." 2 90
As the mass-consumer culture fused with pluralist democracy,
corporations sought to exercise greater control over democracy and
government.291 Starting in the 1960s and 1970s, the number of organized
interest groups lobbying in Washington, D.C., began to increase rapidly.292
While 5,843 national nonprofit associations existed in 1959,293 that number
had nearly tripled to 14,726, by 1980, and it had jumped to 22,289 by
1990.294 These proliferating interest groups represented a wide variety of
viewpoints and concerns, including professional associations like the
American Medical Association, religious organizations like the Christian
Coalition, and anti-abortion and pro-choice advocates like the National
Right to Life Organization and the National Abortion and Reproductive
Rights Action League.2 95 Yet, by far, the largest number of associations fell
296
Basically, corporations
into the "trade, business, commercial" category.
became more resolute at using their bureaucratic organizations, and
accumulated wealth to intervene in the pluralist democratic marketplace.297
Over the last five years of the 1970s, for instance, the number of corporate
political action committees zoomed from three hundred to twelve
hundred.298 Even more extreme, from the early 1970s to the early 1980s,

286.

See HERBERG, supra note 136, at 88-89.

287. Id.
288. Id. at 88.
289. Id at 88-89; see id. at 91 (emphasizing free enterprise).

Looking back, Sheldon Wolin

emphasizes the intersection of democracy, capitalism, and the Cold War. POLITICS AND VISION, supra

note 279, at xvi, 552-53.
290.
291.
292.

CASTILLO, supra note 1, at xiii.
KERR, supranote 6, at 7-8.
MARK P. PETRACCA, THE POLITICS OF INTERESTS: INTEREST GROUPS TRANSFORMED 11-15

(1992).
293.
294.
compiled
295.
296.

GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS 2 (2001).
ABSTRACT, supra note 269, at 776 (Table No. 1261: National Nonprofit Associations,
from Encyclopedia ofAssociations).
GROSSMAN & HELPMAN, supra note 293, at 2-3.
ABSTRACT, supra note 269, at 776 (Table No. 1261: National Nonprofit Associations,

compiled from Encyclopedia ofAssociations).
297. See KERR, supra note 6, at 7-8.
298. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: How WASHINGTON
MADE THE RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 118 (2010).
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the number of corporations with registered lobbyists in Washington
expanded nearly fifteen-fold.299
During this era, in 1971, future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell
wrote an influential memorandum to his friend and neighbor, an official for
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.300 Maintaining that the free enterprise
system was under attack from the American left, Powell proposed a detailed
program of response. 3 0 1 For instance, he advocated for the creation of
conservative think tanks that would help counter liberalism on college
campuseS. 302 He also argued that business should use the corporate-owned
media to shape public opinion.30 3 In doing so, corporate spokespersons
should emphasize that any threat to business was a threat to "individual
freedom" 304 -to liberty, in other words. 305 Corporate America, Powell was
suggesting, should expressly equate the interests of business with the liberty
interests of individual AmericanS. 306 Finally, he insisted that business must
begin to assert political power more directly, whether through lobbying or
other means. 3 07 Business, he wrote, must learn "that political power is
necessary; that such power must be assidously [sic] cultivated; and that
3 08
when necessary, it must be used aggressively and with determination."
Businesses answered Powell's call to action with enhanced and aggressive
politicizing.309 Membership in the Chamber of Commerce more than
quadrupled over the next decade.3 10 In 1972, Chief Executive Officers
(CEOs) of some of America's largest corporations formed the Business
Roundtable, committed to expanding corporate political power.31 1
Significantly, as part of this effort, corporations explicitly advocated that
their expenditures fell within the compass of First Amendment
protections. 3 12 During the seventies, Mobil Oil paid to publish in the New
York Times numerous essays, which effectively appeared as op-eds, arguing

299.
300.

Id.; see KERR, supranote 6, at 33-34 (emphasizing expanding corporate political influence).
Memorandum from Lewis Powell on Confidential Memo: Attack of American Free

Enterprise System (Aug. 23, 1971) [hereinafter The Powell Memo]. The memo was addressed to "Mr.
Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Education Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce."

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

See id
Id.
Id.
Id
See The Powell Memo, supra note 300.
Id.
Id.
Id

309. See CHRIS HEDGES, DEATH OF THE LIBERAL CLASS 176-77 (2010) (discussing importance of
Powell's memo); KERR, supra note 6, at 67-68 (same).
310. HARVEY, supra note 49, at 43.

311. Idat43-44.
312.

KERR, supranote 6, at 8.
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that corporate speech was integral to American liberty and democracy. 13 In
fact, over time, corporate advocates successfully changed "the debate from
health, labor, and safety issues [which had predominated during the 1960s
and early 1970s] to the rising cost of big government." 314 Not incidentally,
Powell was sitting on the Supreme Court less than six months after he had
written his memorandum.3 1 5

Despite these corporate advances, the Cold War inherently constrained
316
the extension of capitalism and corporate power. 6 Specifically, the Cold
War tempered laissez-faire dreams on both the international and domestic
fronts." On the international front, the United States after World War II
did not immediately attempt to reinstate the laissez-faire dream of a wideFirst, political
open and unregulated international marketplace. 1
geography imposed boundaries on corporate reach.3 19 Corporations seek
new consumers, regardless of nationality or ethnicity, because new
consumers produce additional profits, but even as corporations went
multinational, they could not go global. 320
With few exceptions,
corporations could not open markets behind the"Iron Curtain." 32 1 Second,
the Bretton Woods monetary system, negotiated toward the end of the war,
was designed to nurture an international capitalist market among the nonIron Curtain countries, but with limits protecting against the types of
economic crises and disasters witnessed during the early twentieth
century. 322 Bretton Woods created the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank (the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development).323 The IMF would monitor and manage exchange rates and
currencies with an eye to avoiding crises.324 The World Bank would
provide funds to underdeveloped and war-ravaged nations. 325 To be sure,
Bretton Woods contained elements that resonated with the interwar

313. Id. at 48-53.
314.

HEDGES, supra note 309, at 177.

315. See The Powell Memo, supra note 300.
316. See infra notes 317-334 and accompanying text.
317. See KERR, supra note 6, at 32-33.

318. See id
319. See generally Stanley D. Metzger, Federal Regulation and Prohibition of Trade with Iron
Curtain Countries, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1000, 1000 (1964).
320. See id.
321. See id. at 1000-01. Winston Churchill introduced the term, Iron Curtain, in 1946. GADDIS,
supra note 1, at 94-95.
322. FRIEDEN, supra note 10, at 475; SAULL, supra note 1, at 62; Benjamin J. Cohen, Bretton
Woods System, in I ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL EcoNOMY 95, 95-97

(R.J. Barry Jones ed., 2001) [hereinafter Bretton Woods System].
323. SAULL, supra note 1, at 62.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 62-63; Bretton Woods System, supra note 322, at 95.
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international market and gold standard. 3 26 The forty-four member nations
agreed to peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar, and the U.S. agreed to
ground the dollar on its gold reserves. 327 Yet, John Maynard Keynes, who
helped create the system, said that it was "the exact opposite of the gold
standard." 3 2 8 Overall, the post-war system was designed to avoid economic
crises "by lowering tariff barriers, stabilizing currencies, and coordinating
government planning with the workings of markets." 3 29 The American and
western European leaders had learned from history: International economic
prosperity should not be left to the whims of an invisible hand.33 0 The
Soviets were the utopians: They insisted that history must fit Marxist theory
The democraticand that a proletarian paradise could be achieved. 3
capitalists of the West had become pragmatists. They now sought practical
solutions for economic and government problems while eschewing utopian
verities, whether laissez-faire or otherwise. 3 3 2 Thus, as soon as the Bretton

Woods system appeared inadequate for rebuilding the war-shattered western
European economies, the U.S. announced 'the Marshall Plan-named for
Secretary of State, George Marshall-which funneled between twelve and
thirteen billion dollars in grants to western European nations. 3 33 Although
aspects of the Marshall Plan might, in the short run, contravene the concept
of a laissez-faire international marketplace, Marshall and President Truman
emphasized its practical economic benefits. 33 4
On the domestic front, no matter how strongly corporate capitalists
quested after additional wealth, they could not aggressively attack the
government or undermine democratic culture, so long as American
democracy was locked in battle with Soviet communism.33 s For better or
worse, corporate capitalists were, in effect, teammates with the government

326. Bretton Woods System, supra note 322, at 95-96.
327. WYATT WELLS, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1945-2000: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE FROM MASS
PRODUCTION TO THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, 13-14 (2003); Bretton Woods System, supra note 322, at

95-96.
328. M.J. Stephey, Bretton Woods System, TIME (Oct. 21, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/busi
ness/article/0,8599,1852254,00.htmI (quoting Keynes); see Michael D. Bordo, The Bretton Woods
InternationalMonetary System: A Historical Overview, in A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS
SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM 5-58 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry
Eichengreen eds., 1993) (explaining differences between gold standard and Bretton Woods).
329. GADDIS, supra note 1, at 93; see RODRIK, supra note 12, at xvi-xvii, 69-76 (describing
Bretton Woods as successful compromise).
330. See Bretton Woods System, supra note 322, at 95; GADDIS, supra note 1, at 117.
331. See GADDIS, supra note 1, at 32-33; Yoram Gorlizki, Delegalization in Russia: Soviet
Comrades' Courts in Retrospect, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 403, 403 (1998).
332. GADDIS, supra note 1, at 117.
333. SAULL, supra note 1, at 64; WELLS, supra note 327, at 23.
334. See GADDIS, supra note 1, at 30-32; LEFFLER, supra note 1, at 157, 59-61, 63; SAULL, supra
note 1, at 64-68.
335. See KERR, supra note 6, at 31.
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in the fight against communism.336 Thus, if widespread middle class
economic attitudes generated the cultural willingness to negotiate and
compromise politically to engage in the pluralist democratic process-as
numerous political theorists maintained-then the economic middle class
had to be preserved.337 Corporate greed could not squeeze the middle class
In fact, Nixon was not alone in
too excessively, at least not yet.33 8
demonstrably created "a
capitalism
and
mass
consumption
proclaiming that
classless society," and thus countered, "Soviet charges that capitalism
created extremes of wealth and poverty . . . ."339 This assertion, that
capitalism engendered widespread economic equality, which in turn
promoted democratic equality, was a staple of American Cold War
propaganda.340
The 340
documentary film Despotism,341 produced by
Enclycopaedia Britannica, emphasized the inverse: if wealth became too
concentrated in an upper class, if the divisions between the haves and havenots became too distinct, "then despotism threatened."342 To be sure,
neoliberals, often called libertarians during the 1950s, became more strident
defenders of the economic marketplace during this post-World War II era.
In the context of the Cold War, their conservative defense of the market
took on "apocalyptic" proportions. 3 4 Even so, because neoliberals viewed
themselves as "foot-soldiers in the fight against communism," they still
needed to restrain their questioning of democratic government. 34 5
After all, the government was leading the fight against the
communists.

34 6

Whenever the U.S. government successfully persuaded a

third-world nation to align against the Soviet Union, American

336. See id. at 31-32.
337.

See DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTEREST AND PUBLIC

OPINION 521-23 (2d ed. 1971); see Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 50-54, 56-60, 62-64
(1955); see V.0. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 54-57 (2d ed. 1947).
338. See COHEN, supranote 244, at 125-26.

339. See id.
340. See id at 126.
341. Encyclopaedia Britannica Films-1946, Despotism & Democracy-Documentary on 1946 or
2007?, VIDEOSIFT.COM, http://videosift.com/video/Despotism-Democracy-Documentary-on-1946-or-

2007.
342. COHEN, supranote 244, at 125.
343. See JONES, supra note 49, at 141 (linking neoliberalism and libertarianism); See NASH, supra
note 44, at 32-36, 46-48 (same); e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 34-35 (1962)
[hereinafter CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM].
344. See JONES, supra note 49, at 120.

345.

See id.
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OF CONGRESS http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/sovi.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) [hereinafter
Revelationsfrom the Russian archives].
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corporations stood to profit as their markets expanded.3 47 In fact, many
conservatives were moved to support government-funded research.348 More
specifically, government support for particular industries and research
related to national defense seemed not only justified, but urgently needed;
whether it involved the development of a hydrogen (fusion) bomb or the
exploration of outer space. 34 9 As Margaret Pugh O'Mara points out, "ColdWar geopolitics prompted new political attention to science," 35 o and
transformed scientists into "elites." 3 5 1 Massive sums of money flowed to
research universities, such as Stanford, MIT, and Harvard, creating affluent
"cities of knowledge." 35 2
The evolution of pluralist democracy into a consumers' democracy
profoundly influenced the Supreme Court justices, especially in free
expression cases.35 In 1942, soon after pluralist democracy had supplanted
republican democracy, the Supreme Court held that the first amendment did
not protect commercial expression.354 The regulation of commercial
advertising, at the time, seemed no different from other permissible
government regulations of the economic marketplace. 5 5 But during the
Cold War, as the mass-consumer culture became increasingly entangled
with democratic processes, the Court modified its treatment of commercial
expression.356 Bigelow v. Virginia, decided in 1975, arose when a
newspaper editor ran an advertisement for the Women's Pavilion, which
The state of Virginia
provided abortion services in another state. 5
convicted the editor for violating a statute that proscribed any
"advertisement" that would "encourage or prompt the procuring of an
abortion." 3 59 Justice Blackmun wrote an opinion for a seven-justice
majority, which included now-Justice Powell, holding the conviction
He began by acknowledging the Court's prior
unconstitutional. 3 60
347.

See JOSEPH D. PHILLIPS, Economic Effects of the Cold War, in CORPORATIONS AND THE

COLD WAR 173, 186-88 (David Horowitz ed., 1969).
348. See id. at 182.
349. See GADDIS, supra note 1, at 35-36, 61-63.
350. MARGARET PUGH O'MARA, CITIES OF KNOWLEDGE: COLD WAR SCIENCE AND THE SEARCH
FOR THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY 5 (2005).

351. See id at 2.
352.
353.

See id at 1-9; See JONES, supranote 49, at 281-82.
See infra notes 354-401 and accompanying text.

354. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
355. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942) (upholding a regulation of the
economic marketplace, specifically in this case, production quotas).

356. See supra notes 242-250 and accompanying text; See generally Bigelow v. Va., 421 U.S. 809
(1975); Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Cent. Hudson
Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv., 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
357. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
358. See id. 811-12.
359. Id. at 811.
360. See id. at 829.
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recognition of several low-value "categories of speech-such as fighting
words, or obscenity, or libel, or incitement-[which] have been held
Nonetheless, Blackmun insisted that "commercial
unprotected." 36 1
advertising enjoys a degree of First Amendment protection." 3 62 Advertising
was no longer "unprotected per se,"363 though the Court allowed that it
could "be subject to reasonable regulation." 364 - Then, by applying a
balancing test, weighing the government interest in regulation against the
First Amendment interest in free expression, the Court held this particular
statutory proscription unconstitutional.365
In the following year, 1976, the Court explained that the first
amendment protected advertising because commercial expression and
pluralist democracy had become inseparable.366 In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,3 67 the Court held
unconstitutional a state law that prohibited licensed pharmacists from
advertising prescription drug prices. 3 68 Democracy involves the allocation
of resources in society, the Court explained, but most resource-allocation
decisions. are made through the economic marketplace.3 69 "Advertising,
however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is . .
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what
product, for what reason, and at what price," Blackmun wrote for an eightjustice majority, which of course included Powell.370
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made
through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of
public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent
and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable.3 n
In other words, implicitly alluding to the self-governance rationale, the
Court concluded that advertising is essential for "the proper allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system." 3 72 Furthermore, advertising
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Id. at 819
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 821.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 826-29.
See Va. State Bd. ofPharm., 425 U.S. at 765.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
See id, at 752, 755-56, 773.
See id at 765.
Id.
Id.
Va. State Bd. ofPharm., 425 U.S. at 765.
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contributes to intelligent decision-making about how the economic
marketplace "ought to be regulated or altered." 7 Finally, regardless of the
overarching importance of broad political debates and democratic decision
making-whether about economic regulations, candidates for high office, or
otherwise-Blackmun stressed that most people care more about their
personal consumer-oriented decisions. 3 74 "As to the particular consumer's
interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as
keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate."
The Court continued to resolve commercial expression issues pursuant
to a balancing test, with the definitive statement of this approach coming in
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 376 decided in 1980.3" This time, Powell wrote

the majority opinion invalidating a state ban on promotional advertising by
utility companies.s In numerous subsequent cases, the Court has invoked
Powell's four-part balancing test from Central Hudson to determine the
constitutionality of commercial speech regulations. 3 79 Unsurprisingly, the
reasoning in Powell's Central Hudson opinion echoed his 1971
memorandum. 3 80 Most important, Powell equated the interests of individual
Americans with the interests of business: "Commercial expression not only
serves the economic interest of the [business] speaker, but also assists
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
Moreover, he emphasized the
dissemination of information." 38 1
38 2
significance of the private sphere in relation to the public sphere.
"[M]any, if not most, products," he wrote, "may be tied to public concerns
with the environment, energy, economic policy, or individual health and
safety." 3 83
In 1976, the same year the Court decided Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, the Court first examined the constitutionality of campaign
finance regulations. 38 4 The seminal decision, Buckley v. Valeo,385 upheld a
373. Id.
374. See id. at 763-65.
375. Id. at 763.
376. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
377. See id. at 566.
378. See id. at 570-72.
379. Id. at 566 (articulating four-part balancing test); see, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 574 (2001) (applying CentralHudson test); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 487,
526-27 (1996) (same).
380. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62; The Powell Memo, supranote 300.
381. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62.
382. See id.
383. Id. at 562 n.5.
384. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6, 12-13; Va. State Bd. ofPharm.,425 U.S. at 748.
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statutory restriction on campaign contributions to candidates but invalidated
a restriction on campaign expenditures, whether made by candidates,
individuals, or groups (including political action committees).3 86
A
contribution is money given directly to a candidate (and thus within the
candidate's control), while an expenditure is money spent on a campaign,
but never within a candidate's immediate control.
With Powell joining a
per curiam majority opinion, the Court stressed the political importance of
spending money in our consumers' democracy.388 "A restriction on the
amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication
during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached."389 Money had now become speech
"because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass
society requires the expenditure of money." 3 90 The Court nonetheless
upheld the limits on campaign contributions largely because money given
directly to a candidate created at least the appearance of corruption, if not
constituting actual corruption. 3 9 1 When it came to campaign expenditures,
however, the Court reasoned that the danger of corruption or the appearance
of corruption was greatly diminished.3 92
Thus, emphasizing the
confrontational political battles characteristic of pluralist democracy (rather
than the supposedly virtuous civil exchanges that might generate the
republican democratic common good), the Court evoked the selfgovernance rationale and concluded that limits on expenditures were
unconstitutional.3 93
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was
designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources, and to assure unfettered

385.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).

386. See id at 143; (summarizing holding); MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, MONEY AND FREE SPEECH:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE COURTS 55 (2005) (explaining Buckley).

387.
388.
389.

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78-80.
See id at 26-27, 101-02.
Id. at 19.

390. Id. In Buckley, the justices, for the first time, used the phrase, "money is speech;" Stewart
used the phrase during oral argument, and White used it in his opinion. Id.; GORDON SILVERSTEIN,
LAW's ALLURE: How LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS 167-68 (2009).

391.
392.
393.

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26, 35.
See id. at 46-47.
See id. at 51.
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interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.39 4
The Buckley Court did not explicitly discuss restrictions on corporate
campaign expenditures, but the justices addressed that issue two years later
3 95
With a majority opinion
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.
written by Powell, the Court invalidated a state law that prohibited business
corporations from spending money to influence voters in referendum
Once again, Powell's reasoning echoed his 1971
elections.396
397
He equated corporate interests with individual interests,
memorandum.
and then explicitly extended First Amendment protections to
Powell explained that the source of speech, corporate or
corporations.
399
while the nature of the speech was crucial.
irrelevant
was
otherwise,
Building on this premise, Powell invoked the self-governance rationale to
support corporate speech:
'[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of
[the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.' If the speakers here were not corporations,
no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed
speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in
a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from
a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual.4 00
By focusing on the self-governance rationale, the conservative justices
underscored the importance of free speech, and by protecting free speech,
the justices simultaneously enhanced the protection of liberty vis-A-vis
economic wealth.40 1
In short, the development of the consumers' democracy changed how
4 02
the justices, particularly the conservative ones, viewed free expression.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Id. at 48-49 (internal citations omitted).
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767.
See id at 777-78, 784; The Powell Memo, supranote 300.
See FirstNat'! Bank, 435 U.S. at 799-800, 802.
See id.at 777-78, 784.
Id. at 776-77 (internal citations omitted).
See supranotes 354-401 and accompanying text.

402.

See infra notes 402-15 and accompanying text. Rehnquist was one conservative justice who

did not go down this path. See First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 822-23, 828. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that corporate campaign finance restrictions are constitutional).
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Free expression no longer was merely a civil liberty to be asserted by
minorities and dissidents.4 03 Because of the fusion of democracy and the
mass consumer culture, the expenditure of wealth became integral to
politics. Spending money became a form of political expression.404 Thus,
the conservative justices sought to energize the protection of liberty, as
manifested in free speech.405 In short, libertarian conservatism came to the
406
Court, albeit from an unexpected direction.
Conservative constitutional
scholars and Supreme Court justices began to follow the traditionalist path,
with its focus on moral clarity, largely for the same reason as other
407
They rebelled against the ethical relativism of pluralist
conservatives.
democracy and its manifestation in multiculturalism. 408
In general,
libertarianism had also gained a foothold in American conservatism in
reaction against an aspect of pluralist democracy, namely, its expansion of
national government power. 4 0 9 To be sure, conservative constitutional
scholars eventually followed this libertarian path to argue against exercises
of congressional power. 4 10 Moreover, the conservative justices would begin
in the 1990s to implement this libertarian approach in congressional power
and Tenth Amendment cases.411 Yet, in free speech cases, conservative
justices had already moved in the libertarian direction: The Court decided
Bigelow and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy in the mid-1970s.412 In
those commercial speech cases, the conservative justices did not react
against pluralist democracy.4 13 Instead, they acted in accord with pluralist
democracy-as transformed into a consumers' democracy-relying on the
4 14
self-governance rationale, characteristic of the pluralist democratic era.

403. See id. at 776-77.
404. See id at 810 (White, J., dissenting).
405. See, e.g., id at 795.
406.

See infra notes 408-09, 415 and accompanying text.

407. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512, 536 (1997) (focusing on Fourteenth
Amendment, section five); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52, 583, 589, 592 (1995) (focusing
on commerce clause); N.Y. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156, 189 (1992) (focusing on Tenth
Amendment).
408. See generally City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (focusing on Fourteenth Amendment, section

five); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (focusing on commerce clause); New York, 505 U.S. 144 (focusing on Tenth
Amendment).
409. See NASH, supra note 44, at 46-49.
410. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope ofthe Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387 (1987) (Epstein and Randy Barnett are prominent libertarian scholars); RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter TAKINGS].
411. See generally City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (focusing on Fourteenth Amendment, section

five); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (focusing on commerce clause); N.Y, 505 U.S. 144 (focusing on Tenth
Amendment).

412. See generally Va. State Bd. ofPharm., 425 U.S. 748; Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809.
413. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819-21.
414.

See id.
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In the context of the consumers' democracy, in other words, the
conservative justices seized upon the libertarian emphasis on individual
liberty, particularly vis-i-vis the economic marketplace.41
III. DEMOCRACY, INC., AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

By the end of the Cold War-the end arrived gradually, from 1989 to
1992-conservative constitutional scholars had long been in the
traditionalist camp, condemning relativism and advocating for moral
clarity.416 But partly because of a change in the Court's personnelparticularly the replacement of the liberal Thurgood Marshall with the
conservative Clarence Thomas-this focus on moral clarity became a
hallmark in the early 1990s of not only conservative scholarship, but also
conservative Supreme Court decision making.4 17 Among scholars, Bork
still led the way.4 18 He condemned the Court's free speech jurisprudence
for protecting mere "self-expression, personal autonomy, or individual
,,41942
420
for example, the defendant had
In Cohen v. California,
gratification.
worn into a courthouse a jacket inscribed with the message, "Fuck the
Draft." 4 2 1 Bork condemned the Court's reversal of the defendant's
422Thmao
The majority opinion "asked 'How is
conviction for disturbing the peace.
one to distinguish this from any other offensive word?' and answered that
no distinction could be made since 'one man's vulgarity is another's
lyric."' 423 Bork did not similarly stumble over this distinction.424 To him,
4 25
Governmental
"'Fuck the Draft"' was vulgar-nothing lyrical about it.
and non-governmental institutions must be allowed and encouraged to
promote the appropriate values. 4 26 "[I]n a republican form of government

415. See supra notes 411-15 and accompanying text.
416. See GADDIS, supra note 1, at 238, 257 (discussing end of Cold War); JAMES T. PATTERSON,
RESTLESS GIANT: THE UNITED STATES FROM WATERGATE TO BUSH V. GORE 195 (2005) [hereinafter
RESTLESS GIANT].
417. Maureen Dowd, The Supreme Court; ConservativeBlack Judge, Clarence Thomas, is Named
to Marshall'sCourt Seat, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (July 2, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/02/
us/supreme-court-conservative-black-judge-clarence-thomas-named-marshall-s-court.html.
418. See Nina Totenberg, Robert Bork's Supreme CourtNomination 'ChangedEverything, Maybe

Forever', N.P.R., (Sept. 19, 2012) http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsalipolitics/2012/12/19/167645600/robertborks-supreme-court-nomination-changed-everything-maybe-forever.
419. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
AMERICAN DECLINE 99 (1996) [hereinafter SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH].

LIBERALISM

AND

420. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
421. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16-17.
422. See ROBERT H. BORK, A TIME TO SPEAK: SELECTED WRITINGS AND ARGUMENTS 243 (2008)
[hereinafter A TIME TO SPEAK].
423. Id.; see SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH, supra note 419, at 99 (discussing Cohen).
424. See A TIME TO SPEAK, supra note 422, at 243.

425.

See id.at 243-44.

426.

See id. at 243.
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where the people rule," Bork wrote, "it is crucial that the character of the
citizenry not be debased." 4 27
The conservative justices heeded this clarion call by promoting moral
428
clarity in numerous contexts,48
including free expression cases, particularly
those where private (non-government) actors sought to express religious
views or values on government-owned property. 429 The Court consistently
analyzed such religious-expression cases pursuant to public forum doctrine
and concluded that the government must allow Christian organizations to
spread their messages on public (school) properties.4 30 In Rosenberger v.
Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia,4 3 1 decided in 1995, the
five conservative justices-Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and
Kennedy-held that the First Amendment required the University of
Virginia to fund a student newspaper, Wide Awake, dedicated to evangelical
"proselytizing."4 32 Wide Awake explicitly challenged ". . . 'Christians to
live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to
encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus
Christ means. "33
The justices reached a similar result in a grade school
setting. In Good News Club v. Milford Central School,434 decided in 2001,
the five conservative justices, joined by Breyer, held that a public school
violated free expression by denying access to "a private Christian
organization for children ages 6 to 12" that sought to hold club meetings on
school property.435 Writing for the majority, Thomas chastised the lower
court for its ostensible hostility toward Christianity;436 prior cases already
established the constitutional protection of Christian education and
proselytizing on public property, including schools, and the Good News
Club case was indistinguishable.437
To be clear, in these cases, the conservative justices did not appear to be
motivated by an unshakable desire to protect free expression in all
427.
428.

SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH, supra note 419, at 141.
For example, the conservative justices push for moral clarity in establishment-clause cases.

See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645, 662-63 (2002) (upholding school voucher
program that allowed parents to use public money to pay for religious-school education).

429. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645, 662-63.
430. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Assn, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).

The Court

has deemed property such as the streets and parks, open for public speaking from time immemorial, to be

a public forum. Id. at 45. In the public forum, the first amendment prohibits the government from
restricting speech based on its content unless the government satisfies strict scrutiny. Id. On other
government property, however, the government can impose any reasonable restrictions on expression. Id.

431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

515 U.S. 819 (1995).
See id. at 822, 845-46; id. at 874-75 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 826.
533 U.S. 98 (2001).
Id. at 102-03.
See id. at 110-12.
See id at 107-10.
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contexts-because free expression should be treated as a constitutional
lodestar-but rather by a desire to bolster moral clarity through the
438 Thus, in other cases
promotion of traditional religious (Christian) values.
where the protection of free speech might undermine the promotion of
4 39
For instance, a
moral clarity, the justices have sacrificed free speech.
4 40
Amendment
First
2007 decision, Morse v. Frederick, rejected a student's
claim and deferred to the school principal's decision to suspend the student
for displaying a banner, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS." 4 41 A 2009 decision,
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,44 2 appeared to present a religious
443 In its city park,
expression issue subject to a public forum analysis.
Pleasant Grove displayed several privately donated monuments, including
one showing the Ten Commandments, contributed years earlier by the
Fraternal Order of Eagles. 44 4 Summum, a minority religious group, offered
to donate a monument displaying its Seven Aphorisms (also called the
The city refused to accept the
Seven Principles of Creation)." 5
4 46
and Good News Club and,
Rosenberger
like
this
case
Was
monument.
The Supreme Court held
doctrine?
forum
therefore, governed by the public
44 7
"[T]he display of a permanent monument in a public park is
otherwise.
not a form of expression to which forum analysis applies," Alito reasoned
for the majority.448 "Instead, the placement of a permanent monument in a
public park is best viewed as a form of government speech and is therefore
44 9
As Alito
not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause."
Clause
Speech
Free
explained the government speech doctrine: "The
regulate
restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not
government speech."450 Comparing Summum with Rosenberger and Good
438.

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REv. 723, 724 (2011)

(arguing that, overall, the Roberts Court has a "dismal record" in free-speech cases); see generally David
Kairys, The Contradictory Messages of Rehnquist-Roberts Era Speech Law: Liberty and Justice for
Some, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 195, 195-96 (explaining Rehnquist and Roberts Courts' inconsistencies in
free-expression cases).

439. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2010) (upholding

punishment of speech that might provide material support to foreign terrorist organizations, even without

proof of likely harm); Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 538-39 (2006) (limiting severely prisoner access to
written materials and photographs).

440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Id. at 396-97.
555 U.S. 460 (2009).
1d. at 464.
Id. at 464-65.
Id at 465.
Id.
See PleasantGrove, 555 U.S. at 464.
See id.
See id.

450.

Id at 467 ("If petitioners [the city] were engaging in their own expressive conduct, then the

Free Speech Clause has no application").

300

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

News Club, the justices, it would seem, will allow (or require) the
government to adopt and display traditional (Christian) values and symbols
while refusing to adopt and display other values and symbols.4 5 1
A. The Rise ofDemocracy, Inc.: An Attack on Government
The end of the Cold War ushered in a significant change in American
society that, in turn, would influence the Supreme Court so strongly as to
outweigh the conservative justices' commitment to moral clarity. 45 2 The
American celebration of the nation's victory in the Cold War obscured
potential untoward ramifications of that success. 4 53 Just as the Cold War
had helped shape the evolution of pluralist democracy from the 1940s to
1990, the end of the Cold War would shape its further evolution. 45 4 Most
important, as discussed, the Cold War had constrained corporate capitalism
on both the international and domestic fronts.455 For instance, the political
geography of the Cold War had limited the international scope of corporate
markets.456 Quite simply, McDonald's could not open a franchise in Prague
or Moscow in 1975.457 Perhaps more important, the Cold War struggle
against communism limited the degree to which corporations could attack
the process and culture of democratic government.4 58 If the alternative to
pluralist democracy was totalitarian communism, then American critics of
democracy were compelled to curb their denunciations.4 59 With the end of
the -Cold War, these constraints on corporate capitalism evaporated.46 0
To be sure, at the level of theory, neoliberal libertarianism evolved
during the years of the Cold War by gradually shedding its earlier
acceptance of government interventions in the economic marketplace. 46 1
Neoliberals became market fundamentalists, insisting that the unregulated
market could best resolve all social and economic problems.4 62 Any type of
government planning or regulation smacked of hubris. 4 6 3 Hayek led the
way in this attack on government. "Human reason can neither predict nor

451. See generally Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. 460; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819; Good News Club,
533 U.S. 98.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

See
See
See
See
See

infra notes 454-61 and accompanying text.
DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 15.
KERSCH, supra note 41, at I12-117.
DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 15.
Metzger, supra note 319, at 1000.

457.

See id

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

See KERR, supranote 6, at 31.
See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at I1-13; JONES, supra note 49, at 120.
FRIEDEN, supranote 10, at 378.
See infra notes 463-73 and accompanying text.
See BLOCK & SOMERS, supra note 12, at 3-4 (explaining the term market fundamentalism).
See JONES, supra note 49, at 109.
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deliberately shape its own future," he wrote in 1960.464 "Progress by its
very nature cannot be planned." 4 65 The real world was too complex for
government to predict and control through rational planning, neoliberals
asserted.466 The invisible hand and the market were far more efficient in
accounting for human desires and actions.4 6 7 "[The invisible hand] is a
highly sophisticated and subtle insight," explained Milton Friedman in
1976.468

The market, with each individual going his own way, with no
central authority setting social priorities, avoiding duplication, and
coordinating activities, looks like chaos to the naked eye. Yet
through [Adam] Smith's eyes we see that it is a finely ordered and
delicately tuned system, one which arises out of man's actions, yet
is not deliberately created by man. It is a system which enables the
dispersed knowledge and skill of millions of people to be
469
coordinated for a common purpose.
47 0
By this time, then, Friedman was unequivocally preaching laissez-faire.
Neoliberals completely rejected "economic planning, social democracy, and
New Deal liberalism." 47 1 The unregulated market, they asserted, maximized
4 72
individual liberty and human dignity.

A growing American conservative movement absorbed these views in
the 1970s and 1980s.473 To a great degree, the neoliberal message had been
474
The
simplified and thus had become more politically pointed and useful.
early neoliberals had sought to mediate between laissez-faire and New Deal
liberalism-an intermediate position difficult to stake out and
4175
Yet, shortly after World War II, Hayek explicitly
communicate.
articulate a "Utopian" program to influence
neoliberals
that
recommended

464.

17 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 94

(Ronald Hamowy ed., 2011).
465. Id.
466. See id. at 94-95.
467. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ADAM SMITH'S RELEVANCE FOR 1976: SELECTED PAPERS NO. 50 15
[hereinafter ADAM SMITH'S RELEVANCE].

468. Id
469. Id. at 15-16. Hayek emphasized the superiority of the empirical practices and institutions of
the economic marketplace over rationalist attempts at social improvement. HAYEK, supra note 464, at

118-25.
470.
471.
472.
473.

See
See
See
See

ADAM SMITH'S RELEVANCE, supranote 467, at 1.
JONES, supra note 49, at 8.
HARVEY, supra note 49, at 5; See JONES, supra note 49, at 118-19.
JONES, supra note 49, at 9, 86.

474. See id.
475. Seeid.at118-1l9.
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public opinion and inspire enthusiasm.476 As it turned out, Hayek was right
on this account: A straightforward laissez-faire utopianism was far easier to
explain and sell.477 Not only was it clearer, but it also resonated closely
with traditional American individualism as well as other forms of
libertarianism. 478 This more aggressive neoliberal libertarian thinking
gained political traction in the late 1970s and 1980s. 4 79 Perhaps, most
important, the post-World War II Bretton Woods system collapsed.480
Consistent with Keynesian economics, Bretton Woods blended the capitalist
marketplace with democratic-welfare governments.4 8' Overall, this system
produced long-running and widespread (though not universal) prosperity,
especially for the United States.482 But in the 1970s, both high inflation and
high unemployment hit the U.S. and other western industrialized nations.483
Suddenly, Keynesian policies seemed unable to deal with this so-called
stagflation.484 These economic problems provided political ammunition for
advocates of neoliberal libertarianism. 485 Adding to this political shift in
America, the wealthy or upper class became dissatisfied with their share of
the economic pie.486 For nearly three decades after World War II, the top
one percent of income earners accrued approximately eight percent of the
national income on an annual basis. 4 87 When the American economy was
booming, the wealthy appeared to find this income distribution
acceptable.488 But when stagflation hit, the upper class became dissatisfied
with its share of income and wealth.489 Consequently, many wealthy
476. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Intellectuals and Socialism, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 417,432-33
(1948) [The Intellectuals and Socialism].
477. See, e.g., BLOCK & SOMERS, supra note 12, at 105.
478. See id at 99-100; JONES, supra note 49, at 9, 86-87; see generally JOHN DEWEY,
INDIVIDUALISM: OLD AND NEW (1930) (discussing individualism); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974) (presenting philosophical defense of libertarianism).
479. See JONES, supra note 49, at 9, 86.
480. See COHEN, supranote 244, at 100-01.
481. See FRIEDEN, supra note 10, at 359.
482. See id at 359-60; See also RODRIK, supra note 12, at xvii (calling Bretton Woods a "roaring
success").
483. See FRIEDEN, supranote 10, at 359-60.
484. See id at 363; see also ROBERT B. HORWITZ, AMERICA'S RIGHT: ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT
CONSERVATISM FROM GOLDWATER TO THE TEA PARTY 16 (2013); see, e.g., Paul Craig Roberts, The
Breakdown ofthe Keynesian Model, in SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1-2 (Richard

H. Fink ed., 1982) (criticizing Keynesian approach).
485.
486.
487.

See FRIEDEN, supra note 10, at 363, 378.
See HARVEY, supranote 49, at 15.
See id; Facundo Alvaredo et al., The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical

Perspective, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3-4 (Table: Top 1 Percent Income Shared in the United States); see
also Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality 8, CENTER ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Revised Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3629
(Figure 1: Income Gains Widely Shared in Early Postwar Decades, But Not Since Then).
488. See HARVEY, supranote 49, at 15.

489. See id.
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Americans threw their political weight behind the neoliberal views
expressed by Ronald Reagan when he ran for president in 1980.490 Then
Reagan, in the U.S., and Margaret Thatcher, in Britain, began to implement
49
neoliberal elements into their economic policies. 1 For instance, the
Reagan administration started deregulation,-relaxing anti-trust policies
that facilitated corporate mergers, such as those between oil giants Gulf,
Texaco, and Chevron.492 Reagan's anti-union stance, as evidenced by his
pro-employer appointments to the National Labor Relations Board,
49 3
Meanwhile, Reagan cut
enhanced corporate strength in the marketplace.
the top marginal tax rate from seventy to twenty-eight percent while
claiming that supply-side or "trickle-down" economics would generate
more revenue for the government and greater prosperity for rich and poor
alike.494 Yet, the Reagan tax cuts, when combined with those of his
successor, President George H.W. Bush, more than quadrupled the national
debt over a twelve-year period while contributing to growing income and
wealth disparities.4 95
When the Cold War ended, the political constraints came off neoliberal
4 97
An
libertarianism. 496 Corporate capitalist power was unleashed.
increasing number of corporations went multinational, with many flocking
into former Iron-Curtain countries.498 For example, "Daewoo spent $1.5
billion to build two Polish auto plants; Sony set up state-of-the-art factories
to make consumer electronics in Hungary; Goodyear took over a Polish
tiremaker; Volkswagen bought up the Czech Republic's respected Skoda
automaker." 49 9 From the end of the Cold War to 2002, the number of
multinational corporations jumped from approximately thirty-seven
thousand to sixty-three thousand.500 These multinationals reached ever
deeper into new markets.sor McDonalds, in effect, became "McWorld,"
opening in Prague, Moscow, East Berlin, and dozens of other cities
490.

See JONES, supranote 49, at 19, 263.

491. See id. at 19, 263-69; see also WELLS, supra note 327, at 129-132, 134-35 (Income
distribution started to change dramatically in America in the 1980s); See also PIKETTY, supra note 12, at

24 (Figure: Income Inequality in the United States, 1910-2010).
492. See WELLS, supra note 327, at 129-30.
493. See id. at 130-35.
494. See STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 8, 89; see generally George Gilder, The Supply-Side, in
SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 14 (Richard H. Fink ed., 1982).
495. See FRIEDEN, supranote 10, at 378; STIGLITZ, supranote 12, at 89, 277.
496. See FREIDEN, supranote 10, at 359.
497. See id. at 378; JONES, supra note 49, at 332.
498. See FRIEDEN, supra note 10, at 430-32; WELLS, supra note 327, at 179 (discussing

globalization in 1990s).
499.
500.

See FRIEDEN, supra note 10, at 432.
See LEVIATHANS, supra note 10, at 2, 24-25; MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLRIDGE, supra note 10,

at 173.
501. See PHILLIPS, supra note 276, at 147-48 (describing growth of corporations).
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formerly behind the Iron Curtain. 5 0 2 Multinationals sought to reach "the
universal tribe of consumers [as] defined by needs and wants that are
ubiquitous, if not by nature then by the cunning of advertising." 503 "A
consumer is a consumer is a consumer." 50 4
Corporate business and
investment began to flow around the globe as if national borders no longer
existed.sos
How diverse and far-reaching is a multinational corporation? Unilever
provides one example.o6 Unilever began as a producer of margarine in
1914, but was producing more than sixteen hundred brands by the end of the
twentieth century. 07 After a corporate restructuring, which entailed selling
some of its brands, Unilever still produces Lipton (teas), Hellmann's
(mayonnaise), Knorr (foods), Vaseline (petroleum jelly), Dove (soaps),
Bertolli (oils), Slim Fast (diet foods), Ben & Jerry's (ice cream), Breyer's
(ice cream), and many other brands. 0 s Its products are used in most
households in the United States, the U.K., Canada, Indonesia, and
Vietnam.50 9 As of 2001, twenty-seven percent of Unilever's quarter-million
employees were in Europe; eight percent were in North America; eighteen
percent were in Africa and the Middle East; thirty-two percent were in Asia
and the Pacific, and fourteen percent were in Latin America. 1 o Meanwhile,
McDonalds was serving three million burgers per day in at least one
hundred nations by the mid-1990s.5 11 Mattel, at that point, made "[t]he
quintessentially American Barbie Doll" into a global affair by drawing
materials from and manufacturing parts in an international array of
countries, including the United States, Taiwan, Japan, China, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Hong Kong. 512 By the year 2000, more than half of the
world's largest economies, based on gross domestic product, were
corporations, rather than nations. 1
By 2002, approximately fifty
multinational corporations were wealthier than between 120 and 130

502.

See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MC WORLD (1995).

503. Id. at 23.
504. Id.
505.

See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLRIDGE, supra note 10, at 173-74; OHMAE, supra note 10, at 2-3,

5,7.
506. See LEVIATHANS, supra note 10, at 21-22.
507. See id at 21 (Unilever did not originate as a United States firm).
508. See id; View our Brands, UNILEVER BRANDS, http://www.unileverusa.com/brands-inaction/view-brands.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
509. LEVIATHANS, supranote 10, at 21.

510. Id. at 21-22.
511.
512.
513.

MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLRIDGE, supra note 10, at 175.
See FRIEDEN, supranote 10, at 417.
See LEVIATHANS, supranote 10, at 1, 25-26.
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nations. 514 Multinational corporations could rightly be called the "new
5 5
Leviathans," as they challenged the power and wealth of nation-states. 1
Besides the end of the Cold War, multiple causes contributed to
globalization and the spread of multinational corporations. "6 Deregulation,
reduced taxes, government perks, and technological changes all played
For instance, and most obviously, communication technologies
roles.s1
based on the Internet facilitated the development of international businesses
In addition, innovations in
and international financial markets. 1
more rapid shipping of
and
expensive
less
transportation, leading to
5 19
communication and
Advanced
products, contributed to globalization.
transportation technologies, together with the "free mobility of capital,"
allow corporations to manufacture products wherever labor costs are low
and environmental restrictions are lax, and then to sell the products where
incomes are high.520 Furthermore, the corporations can still locate their
offices where taxes are minimal, the views are enticing, the culture is
exciting, or anywhere else.52 ' Indeed, because of the combined corporate
capabilities to shift capital and to ship products rapidly around the world,
corporations can pressure nations to minimize labor demands, lower taxes,
Ultimately, though, the
and diminish environmental regulations. 52 2
of profit: Multinational
pursuit
the
was
globalization
of
overriding cause
of where they could be
regardless
profits
corporations sought to maximize
523
accrued.
In the United States, multinational corporations dominate the mass
consumer culture as never before. 52 4 In the twenty-first century, individuals
rarely buy their mass produced items at independent Mom-and-Pop
stores. 52 5 Instead, people shop at Target, Wal-Mart Supercenter, or online at
Amazon.com.5 26 The American economy has thoroughly transformed into a
corporate capitalist system. 52 7 Previously, corporations in the U.S. had
514. Id at 1.
515. Id at 12.
516.
517.
518.

See infra notes 518-524 and accompanying text.
BAKAN, supra note 10, at 21; OHMAE, supranote 10, at 4; LEVIATHANS, supra note 10, at 35.
See FRIEDEN, supranote 10, at 395-96; OHMAE, supranote 10, at 4; STIGLITZ, supranote 12,

at 74-76.
519.
520.

See BAKAN, supranote 10, at 21-22.
See STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 74; BAKAN, supra note 10, at 22; LEVIATHANS, supra note

10, at 35-36.
521.

See STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 74-75.

522.

Id at 74-76.,

523.

See OHMAE, supranote 10, at 2-5.

524.

See id.

525.

See generally BARBER, supranote 502.

526.
527.

See id. at 23-24.
See id. (describing McWorld); PHILLIPS, supra note 276, at 229, 284, 286 (explaining the

process of corporate trans-nationalization).
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followed Lewis Powell's memorandum by increasing their determination to
influence public opinion and interest-group machinations.52 8 With the end
of the Cold War, the increased wealth and power of large and multinational
corporations. was also brought to bear.5 2 9 The result? The democratic
system became corporate dominated. 5 30 America's consumers' (pluralist)
democracy transformed into Democracy, Inc.53 Not only have democratic
politics become more capitalistic or market oriented, but also corporate
capitalism has become more politically potent. 53 2 With ever-increasing
proficiency, corporations manipulate elections and government for their
own advantage-benefiting the respective corporations as well as corporate
business in toto.

Citizens still vote, but corporations strongly influence

"highly managed elections" and shape government policy between
elections.534 Corporate and government power coexist incestuously, with
officials going back and forth between corporate and government
positions.5 35 Thus, government agencies suffer from "regulatory capture":
The officials appointed to monitor an industry either worked previously in
that same industry or are otherwise strongly sympathetic to its needs.536 For
example, when the time comes for an appointment to the Federal Reserve,
which regulates banking, bank lobbyists will push for a candidate who
believes banks do not need government monitoring because the market is
Given these types of arrangements, the system readily
self-regulating.
self-propagates: Corporate wealth skews electoral outcomes and
government policies, while government officials and policies further
contribute to wealth inequality, in general, and corporate power, more
specifically. 538
At the end of the Cold War, the neoconservative Francis Fukuyama had
metaphorically called the collapse of the Soviet Union the "end of
history." 539 American democracy and capitalism had been locked in
528. See supra Part II.B.2.
529. PHILLIPS, supra note 347, at 20.
530. See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 298, at 118.
531. See generally WOLIN, supra note 14; ALLEN, supra note 14.
532. See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 298, at 118.
533. WOLIN, supra note 14, at 149; see HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 298, at 118-19; DARA Z.
STROLOVITCH, AFFIRMATIVE ADVOCACY: RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN INTEREST GROUP POLITICS

209-10 (2007) (statistics showing corporations and businesses dominate lobbying).
534. See WOLIN, supra note 14, at 63, 135, 149.
535. Id. at 63, 135.
536. STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 59 (Stiglitz refers to the latter situation, when an official is
sympathetic to the industry, as "cognitive capture."); WOLIN, supranote 14, at 63, 135-36.
537. See STIGLITZ, supranote 12, at 60.
538. See PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 24 (Figure: Income Inequality in the United States, 19102010). Thomas Piketty's graphing of American income inequality shows a sharp increase starting in the

early 1990s, at the end of the Cold War. Id.
539. See generally Francis Fukuyama, The End ofHistory?, THE NAT'L INT. (1989).
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ideological struggle with Soviet communism. 54 0 The United States had won
the battle.541 Democratic government and free-market economics had no
542
At that point in time, most observers assumed
more serious competitors.
that "capitalism and democracy would evolve along compatible lines and
mutually reinforce each other."5 43 After all, during the Cold War era of
consumers' democracy, capitalism, and pluralist democracy had appeared to
5
coexist harmoniously, even buttressing each other. " Yet, the emergence of
Democracy, Inc., called into question this assumption of an ongoing
consonant relationship. 545 Maybe American democracy and capitalism had
not together won the Cold War battle over Soviet communism. 5 46 Instead,
neoliberal libertarianism-laissez-faire capitalism on steroids-had
conquered all.547 It was as if the Cold War had been a scab covering a deep
cut between the logics of capitalism, on the one hand, and democratic
government, on the other. 54 8 The end of the Cold War had torn off the scab,
and suddenly, the tensions between capitalism and democracy were
hemorrhaging all over the floor.549
To be sure, at the global level, the end of the Cold War engendered
transitions to democracy in numerous nations formerly behind the Iron
Curtain.5 50 Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, East Germany, as well as
former geographical regions of the Soviet Union, such as Russia, Lithuania,
55 1
At least
and Estonia, were among the host of burgeoning democracies.
initially, then, winning the Cold War yielded a democracy dividend.552 Yet,
also on a global basis, an outburst of laissez-faire ideology accompanied the
Cold War's end and the related rise of Democracy, Inc.553 The free market

540. See Revelationsfrom the Russian archives, supra note 346.
541. See Robert Gilpin & Jean Millis Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World
Economy in the 21' Century, THE NEW YORK TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/g/gilpincapitalism.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).

542. See id.
543. POLITICS AND VISION, supranote 279, at 596.
544. See Peter Wagner, The Democratic Crisis of Capitalism: Reflections on Political and
Economic Modernity in Europe, THE LSE DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 7 (2011).
545. Francis Fukuyama, The Future ofHistory: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline ofthe
Middle Class?, 91 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 53, 58 (2012).
546. See FRIEDEN, supra note 10, at 439.
547. See WOLIN, supra note 14, at 87.
ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY: GLOBALISATION,
548. See FRAN TONKISS,
CONTEMPORARY
PRODUCTION, INEQUALITY, 60-61 (2006) (emphasizing that globalization exacerbates the tension
between the "expansionary logic" of capitalism and "the domesticating logic of the nation state").
549. See id. (emphasizing that globalization exacerbates the tension between the "expansionary
logic" of capitalism and "the domesticating logic of the nation state").
550. See JUDITH LARGE & TIMOTHY D. SISK, DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMAN SECURITY:
PURSUING PEACE IN THE 2 1 " CENTURY 50-51 (2006).
551. GADDIS, supranote 1, at 258; WALKER, supra note 1, at 310-14.
552. See GADDIS, supra note 1, at 258-60; WALKER, supra note 1, at 310-14.
553. See WOLIN, supra note 14, at 87.
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was endowed with a "divine status."554 The U.S. and Britain pressured the
rest of the world, especially Europe and Japan, to follow neoliberal
libertarian principles for a global economy.555 The so-called "Washington
Consensus"-emphasizing "tax reform, trade liberalization, privatization,
deregulation, and strong property rights"-took hold of international
markets.5 6 Ironically, the IMF and World Bank, originally formed to
implement the Bretton Woods Keynesian-inspired policies, now switched to
neoliberal approaches. 557 New institutions and policies, including the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU), and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), were formed to implement the
"free market mantra" and further promote global capitalism. 558 Business
and financial interests from the wealthiest nations dominated these
international institutions, which predictably emphasized maximizing
profits. 5 9 Ultimately, though, many of the former communist nations did
not respond well to this "shock therapy" approach to laissez-faire
capitalism.560 For instance, during the 1990s, many people in the nations of
the former Soviet Union were plunged into privation.6
Eventually,
economic inequality and its consequences undermined the development of
democracy. 562 In many of the former Soviet nations, and especially in
Russia, many people consequently looked to former Communist Party
563
564
leaders.
Authoritarian government returned.
Meanwhile, in the U.S., the rise of Democracy, Inc., and the
coticomitant flourishing of laissez faire produced aggressive attacks on
democratic government. 565
From the perspective of neoliberal
libertarianism, government determinations of means and goals are irrational
554. JONES, supranote 49, at 338.
555. HARVEY, supra note 49, at 93; STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 53.
556. JONES, supranote 49, at 8; STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 53.
557. STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 10-13.
558. Id at 16; JONES, supra note 49, at 8.
559. STIGLITZ, supranote 10, at 18-20.
560. Id. at 141; FRIEDEN, supra note 10, at 430-31, 438-39; see RODRIK, supra note 12, at 14-16
(emphasizing the role of government institutions in successful capitalist countries).
561. FRIEDEN, supra note 10, at 439.
562. Id.; STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 133-34, 153.
563. See Joshua Kucera, Voting Against Freedom, WILSON QUARTERLY, http://wilsonquarterly.
com/stories/voting-against-freedom (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
564. FRIEDEN, supra note 10, at 431, 439; STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 133-34. For discussions of
democratic failures in Russia, see Kathy Lally & Will Englund, Russia, Once Almost a Democracy, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-once-almost-ademocracy/2011/08/12/glQAMriNOJ_story.html; ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, PUTIN'S RUSSIA: LIFE IN A
FAILING DEMOCRACY (2007); Mikhail Shishkin, Poets and Czars, From Pushkin to Putin: The Sad Tale
ofDemocracy in Russia, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 1, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/1 133

86/pushkin-putin-sad-tale-democracy-russia.
565.
at 11.

See JONES, supra note 49, at 109-10; see, e.g., ADAM SMITH'S RELEVANCE, supra note 467,
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and inefficient.5 6 6 According to pluralist democratic theory, public
(government) goals are determined through the negotiations and
compromises of a wide-open process in which all individuals and groups are
56 7
Neoliberals questioned this
able to contribute their values and interests.

government process on multiple grounds, but primarily by comparing it to
economic transactions in the marketplace. 5 68 For instance, public choice
theorists applied economic analysis to public decision making and
concluded that majority voting, as in democracy, is frequently an irrational
means for making group decisions. 569 Unlike an unregulated economic
marketplace, democracy cannot maximize the satisfaction of individual
interests, at least under certain conditions. 5 70 Thus, public choice theorists
maintained that when the government legislates-for example, by imposing
economic regulations-the legislative decisions do not rest on a rational
calculation of costs and benefits.5 71 Rather, they arise from interest group
572
machinations unrelated to individual preferences and social utility.
Public choice theory illustrates how neoliberal libertarianism pushed
Laissez-faire ideology
beyond nineteenth-century laissez-faire.573
were criticized because
regulations
government
market;
free
celebrated the
574
libertarianism goes
Neoliberal
they interfered with the marketplace.
government.575
democratic
further by directly attacking, by demonizing,
Milton Friedman and other neoliberals insisted that the economic
7
From
marketplace is a wondrous device because of the invisible hand.
this perspective, the market operates so that "the voluntary actions of
millions of individuals can be coordinated through a price mechanism
566. JONES, supra note 49, at 109-10; see ADAM SMITH'S RELEVANCE, supra note 467, at 11
(emphasizing government defects).
567. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 1-11 (1991).

568. See id
569. Id. (summarizing public choice theory); JONES, supra note 49, at 127-32 (discussing public
choice and rational choice theories); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the
Theoretical and 'Empirical'Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 214-15

(1988) (criticizing public choice).
570. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 567, at 38-39 (explaining Arrow's Theorem); WILLIAM
H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 1 (Judith Wilson & Patricia Herbst eds., 1982)
(arguing social choice theory calls democracy into question).

571. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 541 (1983) (arguing
courts should not presume that legislative decisions are rational).
572. See id at 533, 540-41 (arguing courts should not presume that legislative decisions are
rational); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT SCI. 3, 3-4

(1971) (discussing regulatory capture).
573. See Dag Einar Thorsen & Amund Lie, What is Neoliberalism? 5 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with University of Oslo Department of Political Science).

574. See WOLIN, supra note 14, at 87, 177-78.
575.
576.

See RIKER, supra note 570, at 1.
See ADAM SMITH'S RELEVANCE, supra note 467, at 15.
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without central direction."57 7 Each individual's interests and knowledge
lead him or her to pursue desired goals and, simultaneously, lead society as
a whole to pursue appropriate goals.578 But, according to Friedman, the
government operates like a backward reflection of the marketplace.57 9
There is an "invisible hand in politics [that] is as potent a force for harm as
the invisible hand in economics is for good."580 Government actors might
very well have the best of intentions, yet they cannot help but pursue
harmful goals. 58 1

In politics, men who intend only to promote the public interest, as
they conceive it, are 'led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of their intention. They become the front-men
for special interests they would never knowingly serve. 58 2
Private interests necessarily manipulate political processes in ways that
cannot arise in market transactions. 5 8 3
Moreover, even if private interests did not manipulate the government,
democratic processes are inherently inefficient, according to neoliberals.584
If pluralist democracy were to stumble onto an appropriate public goal, such
a goal nonetheless would still be tentative because of the constant and
ongoing political battles inherent to a pluralist society. 8 s Next week, the
government might settle on a different tentative goal. And if not next week,
then next month, or next year. Partly for this reason, the choice of means
for achieving a government-designated goal becomes problematic.586
Suppose the government is able to determine a cost-efficient means for
achieving its democratically established goal. By the time the government
institutionalizes the means, the pluralist democratic process might have
established a different goal. The government is trapped in a kaleidoscopic
hall of mirrors, where means and ends are constantly shifting and

577.
578.
579.
580.

Id.
Id
See id. at 18.
Id

581.

See ADAM SMITH'S RELEVANCE, supra note 467, at 18.

582.
583.

Id.
See id

584.

See J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 101 (Eric A. Posner ed.,

2000).

585. See Kari Karppinen, Making a Diference to Media Pluralism: A Critique of the Pluralistic
Consensus in European Media Policy, in RECLAIMING THE MEDIA: COMMUNICATION RIGHTS AND
MEDIA ROLES 20-21 (Bart Cammaerts & Nico Carpentier eds., 2007).

586. See id. at 20.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

2015]

311

unstable.5 87 Is this any way to run a business? No, of course not. Unlike
88
government, business corporations need not equivocate about goals.1
5 89
Consequently,
They all pursue a single overarching goal: profit.
corporations can focus on constructing the most efficient means for
Rationality unequivocally becomes
achieving their profit goals. 5 9 0
591 Thus, while corporations have the virile confidence
economic efficiency.
592
of heroic certainty, government appears timid and wasteful.
In short, in Democracy, Inc., neoliberal libertarians denigrate
government, in general, and public (or group) decision making pursuant to
democratic processes, more specifically. 593 From the neoliberal perspective,
the private sphere should subsume the public sphere.594 Friedman suggested
as much when he argued that politics and economics were not "separate and
largely unconnected." 595 Political freedom, he insisted, cannot exist unless
individuals enjoy complete economic freedom, which could exist only with
an unregulated marketplace.596 Economics is primary, while politics is
secondary and derivative. 59 7 As Friedman put it, "economic freedom is an
end in itself[, but] economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward
the achievement of political freedom." 98 In a free society, according to
5 99
The
Friedman, economic power provides "a check to political power."
600
key to political freedom, consequently, is a laissez-faire marketplace.
The best society is one that leaves the maximum degree of decision making
60
to the market and the minimum to politics and government. ' The
neoliberal "obsession with the market [has] corroded the idea of the public
587. See Charles R. Kesler, Ph.D., What Separation of Powers Means for Constitutional
Government, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/20
07/12/what-separation-of-powers-means-for-constitutional-government.
588. See Jia Lynn Yang, Maximizing Shareholder Value: The Goal That Changed Corporate
America, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy

/maximizing-shareholder-va...rate-america/2013/08/26/26e9ca8e-ed74-

I e290086 Ie94a7ea20d_story.ht

ml.

589. See id.
590. See Robert L. Heath & Lan Ni, Corporate Social Responsibility, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC
RELATIONS (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.instituteforpr.org/corporate-social-responsibility/.
591. See P.V. (Sundar) Balakrishnan et al., Consumer Rationality and Economic Efficiency: Is the

AssumedLink Justified?, MARKETING MGMT J., 1, 1 (2000).
592.

See Karppinen,supra note 585, at 20-21.

593. See WOLIN, supra note 14, at 177-78.
594.

See CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supranote 343, at 7-8.

595.
596.
597.
598.

Id. at 7.
See id. at 7-8.
See id at 8.
Id

599. CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supranote 343, at 15.
600. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 267 (1962); see JONES, supra note 49, at 116-17
(discussing Friedman).
601. CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supranote 343, at 24.
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realm and ate into its foundations."602 Arthur Brooks, president of the
American Enterprise Institute, declared: "The best government philosophy
is one that starts every day with the question, 'What can we do today to get
out of Americans' way?"' 60 3 Thus, neoliberal libertarians advocate for the
privatization or outsourcing of numerous government functions and
institutions, such as schools, prisons, and policing.604 In theory, privately
owned and run schools, private prisons, and so on, will naturally operate for
the good of society because they will function in accordance with economic
principles, which "allocate resources to their most efficient and productive
use." 605 After all, from the neoliberal viewpoint, "[e]fficiency can only be
achieved through the incentives that are built into markets, which therefore
should become the deliverer of all public systems . . . . Incentive structures,

profit and loss, and customer satisfaction are the values that should drive
public service, just as they drive private enterprise."6 06
While democracy and government-bashing are part-and-parcel of
neoliberal libertarianism, corporations do not merely denounce democratic
government in Democracy, Inc. 6 0 7 Corporations use a multi-layered
systematic strategy to thwart government efforts to regulate business.60 8
First, if Congress (or a state legislature) begins debating an economic
regulatory bill, corporate lobbyists will seek to prevent its enactment. 60 9
Second, if Congress nonetheless passes the regulatory legislation, then
corporate lobbyists will attempt to block congressional funding for its
implementation.610 Third, if Congress perseveres and supplies funding, then
the lobbyists will work to insure the appointment of sympathetic regulators
and, at the agency level, the making of favorable administrative rules (or no
rules at all). 6 11 Fourth, if an agency still manages to adopt restrictive rules
implementing the regulatory law, then the corporations will challenge in
602.

JONES, supra note 49, at 270.

603.

Arthur Brooks, Why the Stimulus Failed,NAT'L REV. (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.nationalr

eview.com/article/328432/why-stimulus-failed-arthur-c-brooks.
604. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 17980, 261 (1998) (supporting the privatization of prisons and law enforcement) [hereinafter THE
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY]; see BAKAN, supra note 10, at 113-38 (discussing privatization); but see
Kimberly N. Brown, "We the People," ConstitutionalAccountability, and OutsourcingGovernment, 88

IND. L.J. 1347, 1348 (2013) (giving examples of where privatization created problems).
605.

See Jones, supranote 49, at 332.

606. Id.
607. See, e.g., Gary Rivlin, Wall Street Fires Back: After Congress Passed Dodd-Frank
Financial Reform, the Real Battle Began, THE NATION, May 20, 2013, at 11-12 (discussing
conservative efforts to thwart regulatory laws).
608. BAKAN, supra note 10, at 97-99; See, e.g., Rivlin, supra note, 607, at 11-12 (discussing
conservative efforts to thwart regulatory laws).

609. Rivlin, supra note, 607, at 14.
610. Id.
611. Id.
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court the validity of the congressional action and the agency rules.6 12 To be
clear, corporate businesses do not view their multi-layered opposition to
government as contravening a public interest or good.613 To the contrary,
from an economic standpoint, they view such anti-government actions as
legitimate means to promote the public interest. 614
Furthermore, corporations not only seek to thwart government
regulations of business, but also attempt to manipulate government to pass
The actions of the American Legislative
pro-business legislation.6t '
Exchange Council (ALEC) illustrate both types of corporate control over
616
ALEC identifies itself as a nonprofit that "works to advance
government.
limited government, free markets, and federalism at the state level through a
nonpartisan public-private partnership of America's state legislators,
members of the private sector and the general public." 617 Its membership
consists of nearly 2,000 state legislators, almost all of whom are
The
Republicans, as well as corporations and corporate officers.618
organization tracks proposed state legislation and flags bills that it deems
anti-business.6 19 Once such a bill is flagged, ALEC then advises legislative
members from the respective state of the drawbacks to the proposed
legislation.620 While such organizational actions are significant, ALEC is
more renowned (or notorious) for its drafting of model legislation, which
lawmakers seek to enact at the state level.62 1 Most of ALEC's funding
comes from corporations, including Pfizer, Bank of America, Wal-Mart,
AT&T, Verizon, and on and on.622 Corporate members can effectively veto
623
any proposed model legislation.

612.

Id.

For examples of statutes that conservatives have fought in this manner, see, e.g.,

Arlington v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866-68 (2013) (challenging agency's
interpretation of a statutory ambiguity in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection
Act concerning the scope of the agency's statutory authority); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,

132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (challenging the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
613. Rivlin, supra note 607, at 11-12.
614. See BAKAN, supranote 10, at 106-07.
615. See Mike McIntire, Conservative Nonprofit Acts as a Stealth Business Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/us/alec-a-tax-exempt-group-mixes-legislators-and-

lobbyists.html?_r-0.
616. See About ALEC, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/about-alec/ (last
visited Mar. 27, 2015); McIntire, supra note 615.

617. Id.
618.

See Membership, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/membership (last

visited Mar. 27, 2015); McIntire, supra note 615.
619.

McIntire, supra note 615.

620. Id.
621. Id.
622. Id.
623. John Nichols, ALEC Exposed: A Trove ofDocuments Reveals the Vast ProcorporateStrategy
of this Powerful Right- Wing Group, THE NATION (July 12, 2011) http://www.thenation.com/article/1619
78/alec-exposed.
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In other words, through ALEC, corporations exercise close control over

'

state legislators and state legislative processes. 624 A prototypical example
involves ExxonMobil, one of the corporate leaders in hydraulic fracturing,
better known as "fracking." 6 25
ExxonMobil sponsored ALEC model
legislation that supposedly would force corporations to disclose information
about chemicals used in fracking fluids.626 The legislation was "promoted
as a victory for consumers' right to know about potential drinking water
contaminants," but in reality, it contained loopholes allowing corporations
to withhold information about important chemicals or fluids, those "deemed
trade secrets." 6 27 State lawmakers thus advocated for the model legislation
as a consumer-protection bill, while not revealing that ExxonMobil helped
mold it to be pro-business. 628 ALEC, however, was not being duplicitous
when it declared in a members-only newsletter that membership was "a
good investment." 629 In a normal year, the newsletter explained, ALEC
lawmakers introduce "more than 1,000 bills based on [its] model
legislation" and successfully enact "about 17 percent of them., 6 30 The
newsletter emphasized: "Nowhere else can you get a return that high." 63
ALEC's operations, one might fairly conclude, are the quintessence of
Democracy, Inc. 6 32
B. The Roberts Court in Democracy, Inc.
If a legislature enacts a regulatory statute and corporate challengers then
lose in the lower courts-that is, the courts uphold the legislation and
agency rules-then the corporations can petition for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court.633 Fortunately, for corporations, the Roberts Court is the
most pro-business Supreme Court since World War 11.634 Of course, some
conservatives have insisted that the Roberts Court is not conservative
enough, that it is not truly pro-business, 63 5 but empirical studies have
624.

McIntire, supra note 615.

625.
626.
627.
628.

Id.
Id
Id
Id.

629.

McIntire, supranote 615.

630.
631.
632.
633.

Id
Id.
See Nichols, supranote 623.
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1254.

634. Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1449
(2013) (quantitative study of all postwar business-related cases); see Ciocchetti, supra note 17, at 404

(emphasizing how strongly the Roberts Court supported business in the 2011-2012 term).
635. See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Supreme Court Isn't Pro-Business, But Should Be, BLOOMBERG
(July 5, 2011, 12:01AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-07-05/supreme-court-isn-t-probusiness-but-should-be-ramesh-ponnuru; Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts
Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943, 975 (2009); Eric Posner, Is the
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persuasively shown otherwise.63 6 In fact, five of the current justices rank
among the top ten justices most favorable to business from the 1946 through
the 2011 terms. 637 Remarkably, Alito and Roberts are first and second on

the list (Powell, incidentally, ranks number eight, one spot ahead of
Scalia).6 M Moreover, particularly in free expression cases, the conservative
justices support First Amendment claims of conservative speakers far more
strongly than those of liberal speakers.639 And as one might expect, the
conservative justices shape the Court's docket accordingly. 640 A study
focusing on the period from May 19, 2009 to August 15, 2012 concluded
that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, representing business, filed more
cert.-stage amicus briefs than any other organization.64 1 Unsurprisingly, the
Chamber had the second-highest success rate.642 Compared with a similar
study conducted five years earlier-partially during the Rehnquist Court
years-the new study underscored that the top sixteen filers of cert.-stage
amicus briefs are now "more conservative, anti-regulatory, and probusiness" than the previous top sixteen, which already were strongly probusiness." The findings also showed that these briefs influence the
justices' decisions when shaping the Court's docket. 64 4 A pro-business
Court responds positively to pro-business petitioners.645
The Roberts Court, it seems, perfectly fits its times. The extent to
which the conservative justices accept and bolster Democracy, Inc., is
nowhere clearer than in free expression cases involving campaign
finance.646 In cases after Buckley and Bellotti, the Court waffled over how

Supreme Court Biased in Favor ofBusiness?, SLATE (March 17, 2008) http://www.slate.com/blogs/con
victions/2008/03/17/is thesupreme court_biased in favor of business.html.
636. MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 213 (2013)
(discussing evidence).

637.
638.

Epstein, supra note 634, at 1472-73.
Id.at1449-51.

639. Lee Epstein et al., Do Justices Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism,
and the First Amendment (APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper) [hereinafter Do Justices Defend the
Speech They Hate?]. Liberal justices also show an in-group bias toward liberal speakers, but it is not as
strong as that of current Roberts Court conservatives. See id; see infra notes 647-51 and accompanying
text.
640. Adam Chandler, Cert.-stageAmicus "All Stars": Where Are They Now?, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr.
4, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/cert-stage-amicus-all-stars-where-are-they-now/.

641.
642.

Id.
Id.

643. Id.; see Adam Chandler, Cert.-stage Amicus Briefs: Who Files Them and To What Effect?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 27, 2007, 12:31 PM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/09/cert-stage-amicus-briefswho-files-them-and-to-what-effect-2/ (the earlier study) [hereinafter Who Files Them and To What

Effect?].
644.
645.
646.

Chandler, supra note 640.
Id
See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1990).
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much the government could regulate corporate political expression.647 The
entrenchment of Democracy, Inc., and the establishment of the Roberts
Court ended this uncertainty. 648 In 2010, in the monumental five-to-four
decision, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,649 the
conservative bloc of justices invalidated provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") that imposed limits on corporate
(and union) spending for political campaign advertisements.650 Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion, which Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
joined, began by articulating two First Amendment premises.6 1' First,
Kennedy reiterated the maxim, initially stated in Buckley, that spending on
political campaigns constitutes speech.652 Second, Kennedy emphasized
that, as stated in Bellotti, free speech protections extend to corporations.653
With those premises in hand, the Court moved to the crux of its reasoning,
that the self-governance rationale mandates free expression to be' a
constitutional lodestar. 654
"Speech is an essential mechanism of
democracy," Kennedy wrote. 65 5 "The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to
speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it." 65 6 From
the Court's perspective, then, corporate expenditures on political campaigns
go the core of the First Amendment.6 57 Restrictions on such political speech
647. See id. 668-69 (upholding restriction on corporate political spending); Fed. Election Comm'n,
v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (invalidating restriction on nonprofit corporations);
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (upholding restriction
on nonprofit corporations); UROFSKY, supra note 386, at 141 (describing Court's confusion); see also

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 94-95, 114, 121-22 (2003) (reaffirming Buckley and
upholding main sections of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
648. Given Rehnquist's stance on commercial speech-he preferred to defer to legislative

decisions, Va. State Bd. ofPharm., 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He unsurprisingly also
often sided with the liberal justices in campaign finance cases. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't

PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 380-81 (2000); Austin, 494 U.S. at 654-55. O'Connor also voted to uphold some
campaign finance restrictions. McConnell, 540 U.S.at 94-95, 113-14. Thus, when Roberts and Alito
replaced Rehnquist and O'Connor, respectively, the conservative bloc of justices was ready to act in
accord with Democracy, Inc.

649. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
650. Id. at 320-21; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
In several cases preceding Citizens United, the Roberts Court invalidated campaign finance restrictions.

Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 731-32(2008) (invalidating federal provisions allowing
certain candidates to have increased contribution and expenditure

limits based on spending of

opponents); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 481-82 (2007) (limiting
restrictions on expenditures by corporations and unions); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262-63 (2006)
(invalidating state limits on contributions).

651. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 316, 339, 342.
652. Id. at 339.
653. Id. at 342.
654. See id at 342-43.
655. Id at 339.
656. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339.
657. Id. at 340, 343.
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6 58
unless
and writing destroy "liberty" and are necessarily unconstitutional,
the government can satisfy strict scrutiny by showing that the regulation is
necessary (or narrowly tailored) to achieve a compelling purpose.659
Whether the government could satisfy strict scrutiny appeared to be, at
least partly, an empirical question.6 60 Was the campaign finance regulation
necessary to achieve the compelling purpose of avoiding corruption or the
appearance of corruption in the democratic process? Indeed, Justice
Stevens's Citizens United dissent stressed that Congress had relied on
"evidence of corruption" when enacting the BCRA campaign finance
. . 661
Moreover, extensive social science research shows that
restrictions.
excessive spending, whether corporate or otherwise, can in fact corrupt or
663
distort democracy in two ways. 66 2 First, it can skew electoral outcomes.
Because running for office requires massive funding, wealthy contributors
can "determine the pools of potential officeholders." 6 64 More broadly,
social and cognitive psychology research demonstrates that wealth can be
used to fund campaign strategies that purposefully manipulate the electorate
66 5
In a 2008 book-length
and "induce sub-optimal vote decisions."
empirical study of the connections between wealth and democracy, Larry
Bartels concluded that had fundraising been equal over the previous fifty
years, the number of Republican presidential victories would have been cut
in half (Bartels, incidentally, revealed that the last time he voted in a
666
Second, wealth can
presidential election, he voted for Ronald Reagan).
667
influence the behavior of government officials after their elections.
Money buys "privileged access for contributors and [includes] the special

658. Id. at 354-55 (quoting The Federalist No. 10, at 130 (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961) (James
Madison)).
659. Id. at 340.
660. See generally INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE
NEED TO LEARN 113-17 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skoepol eds., 2005) (discussing social science
research on the effects of wealth inequality on democracy).
661. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);

see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207 (discussing congressional findings).
662.

INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 660, at 88, 113-15.

663. See generally id
664. See id. at 115.
665. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme
Court's Campaign FinanceJurisprudence,31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 684 (2010).
666. See generally LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
NEW GILDED AGE (2008); Dan Batz, For Richer or For Poorer, WASH. POST (June 15, 2008),
(voting for
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/12/AR2008061203779.html

Reagan); see also Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much ofa Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens
United, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 2365, 2374-75 (2010) [hereinafter Too Much ofa Good Thing] (specifying
marketing mechanisms used to manipulate citizens to vote contrary to how they would vote with
complete information). The empirical evidence does not show, however, that the better financed
candidate always wins the election. Sometimes, the candidate with less funding wins. BRADLEY A.
SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM48-51 (2001).
667. INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 660, at 115.
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attention of [committee] members who reward them with vigorous help in
minding their business in the committee process." , Thus, as one might
expect, empirical evidence shows that government officials are especially
unresponsive to the interests of low-income citizens.
Nonetheless, the Court's application of strict scrutiny is only partly an
empirical question; it is also partly a normative question.6 70 For instance, in
a campaign finance case, the definition of corruption is crucial to the
Court's determination of whether the government has identified a
compelling purpose. 67 ' And in perhaps the most significant aspect of the
Court's reasoning, Citizens United severely narrowed the concept of
corruption. 6 7 2 Indeed, the majority used such a cramped notion of
corruption that the empirical evidence (of corruption) was rendered
irrelevant.
From Kennedy's perspective, only a direct contribution to a
candidate or officeholder can constitute corruption or its appearance. 674 An
independent expenditure, even on behalf of a specific candidate or
officeholder, cannot do so. 675 Thus, apparently, the government cannot ever
justify its regulation of expenditures, whether by corporations or others.676
Ultimately, then, the Citizens United majority concluded that the
government interest in avoiding corruption or its appearance was
insufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.67 7
The BCRA restrictions on
expenditures were unconstitutional.678
In a telling statement, Kennedy reasoned that "[t]he Government has
'muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the
economy."' 67 9 Speech, it seems, no longer emanates from the people, from
citizens, but from "segments of the economy.",6 80 From this standpoint, the
private economic sphere has subsumed the public sphere. 6 8 1 The market

668. Id at 116-17.
669. BARTELS, supra note 666, at 285-86.
670. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
671. Id at 345.
672. Id. at 372.
673. Id. at 345-46, 56, 61-62; see Samuel Issacharoff, On PoliticalCorruption, 124 HARV. L. REV.
118, 118-21 (2010) (arguing Citizens United Court overly narrowed the concept of corruption); Michael
S. Kang, The End of Campaign FinanceLaw, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 64 (2012) (arguing the Citizens United
Court's narrowing of definition of corruption was the most important part of the case).

674. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356-57.
675. Id at 357.
676. Kang, supra note 673, at 25-26.
677. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360-61.
678. Id. at 372.
679. Id. at 354 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 257-58 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part)) (emphasis added).
680. Id. For a similar example, see Davis, where Alito suggested that the strength of a candidate
depends on wealth, the wealth of contributors, or celebrity. Davis, 554 U.S. at 742.
681. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 355-56.
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governs the state.682 Now, our democracy is based on 'one dollar, one
6 83
Citizens United
vote,' [rather] than . . . 'one person, one vote."'
amounted to a judicial proclamation that corporations and other wealthy
entities and individuals can spend unlimited sums in their efforts to control
elections and government policies.68 4 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
685
recognized as much in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission,
decided barely two months after the Supreme Court handed down Citizens
United.686 The D.C. Circuit invalidated limits on contributions to political
action committees that would subsequently use the funds for campaign
expenditures (which would never come within the direct control of an
individual candidate).687 In conjunction with Citizens United, this decision
opened the door to the creation of so-called Super PACs, wielding
enormous sums of money.688 Thus, in the democratic sphere, wealth and
corporate power are unfettered. 6 89 According to the conservative Supreme
Court justices, the liberty embodied in the First Amendment protection of
free speech demands as much.690 Unsurprisingly, after Citizens United and
SpeechNow.org, the flow of funds into the 2010 and 2012 political
69
campaigns increased dramatically from previous election cycles. 1 For the
692
Regardless, subsequent
2012 elections, seven billion dollars was spent.
cases have shown that the conservative justices are steeled to stand strong
for Democracy, Inc. The Court not only has reaffirmed the Citizens United
holding, but has also extended it. 69 3 It's as if Democracy, Inc., has become
official judicial and government dogma.694
In one case, Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett,695 the state of Arizona created a legislative "matching funds
scheme" for campaign financing.696 Under this scheme, a candidate for
state office who accepted public financing would receive additional funds if
a privately financed opponent spent more than the publicly financed
682.
683.

KUHNER, supra note 12, at 26; SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 12, at xii.
STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at xlix-1, 149.

684.
685.
686.
687.

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id.

688.

MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 250-51, 275

(2013).
689.

See infra note 692 and accompanying text.

690.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372.

691. See KUHNER, supra note 12, at 1-4 (detailing sums spent on recent campaigns); Kang, supra
note 673, at 5-6 (discussing the likely effects of Citizens United and its actual impact on 2010 elections).

692.
693.

McCutcheon,134 S. Ct. at 1457.
See id. at 1441.

694.

See infra note 696-723 and accompanying text.

695.
696.

131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
Id. at 2813.
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candidate's initial allocation.69 7 Thus, publicly and privately financed
candidates would be able to spend roughly the same amounts on their
respective campaigns.698 In a five-to-four decision, the conservative
majority held this campaign finance scheme unconstitutional. 6 99 The Court,
once again, emphasized the self-governance rationale,700 and then reasoned
that the flexible public financing system imposed a "penalty" by
diminishing the privately financed candidate's expression.70' In dissent,
Justice Kagan suggested that the majority's reasoning was exactly
backwards.702 The public financing, she explained, "subsidizes and so
produces more political speech."70 3 But the conservative majority was
adamant that any regulation of campaign financing constituted an
unconstitutional burden on free speech:
[E]ven if the matching funds provision did result in more speech by
publicly financed candidates and more speech in general, it would
do *so at the expense of impermissibly burdening (and thus
reducing) the speech of privately financed candidates and
independent expenditure groups. 704
In a second case, American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock,705
"[a] Montana state law provid[ed] that a 'corporation may not make .

.

. an

expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that
supports or opposes a candidate or a political party."' 7 06 The Montana
Supreme Court upheld this statute in the face of a First Amendment
challenge based on Citizens United.707 The Montana Court reasoned that
the specific history in the state-of corporate corruption of democracysupported the state's claim that the regulation was narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling purpose. 708 In yet another five-to-four decision, the
conservative justices on the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. 709 In a per
curiam opinion reversing the Montana Court, the justices reasoned that
"[t]here can be no serious doubt" that Citizens United controlled and
697. Id.
698. See id at 2828-29.
699. Id.
700. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
701. Id. at 2818.
702. Id at 2830.
703. Id at 2833 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
704. Id. at 2821.
705. 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
706. Id. at 2491 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. §13-35-227(1) (2011)).
707. American Trucking Partnership, Inc., Bullock, 132 S. Ct. at 2491.
708. Id. at 2491-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing Western Tradition Partnership v. Attorney
General, 363 Mont. 220 (2011)).
709. Id. at 2491.
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precluded the state from even attempting to demonstrate that its factual
710
situation was unique.
In the most recent campaign finance case, McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission," the Court invalidated federal statutory limits on the
712
Buckley had upheld both
aggregate contributions of campaign donors.
7 13
A base limit restricts the
base and aggregate limits on contributions.
amount a donor can give directly to a single candidate or committee, while
an aggregate limit restricts the total amount a donor can give to all
candidates and committees.714 In McCutcheon, Roberts's plurality opinion
emphasized the narrow definition of corruption articulated in Citizens
United: "'The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars
for political favors."' 7 15 Thus, government restrictions on contributions
716 to prevent "'quid pro
must be "closely drawn" or "narrowly tailored"
7 17
In concluding that aggregate limits on
quo' corruption or its appearance."
contributions were not closely enough tied to corruption, as narrowly
defined, Roberts stated that contributing large sums of money to political
campaigns amounts to "'robustly exercis[ing]' [one's] First Amendment
spends,
rights."718 This view suggests that the more money an individual
719
McCutcheon,
the more vigorous is his or her exercise of free expression.
it should be noted, left intact the base contribution limits, which were not in
7 20
issue, though Roberts characterized them as a "prophylactic measure."
One might reasonably wonder, in the context of Democracy, Inc., whether
the conservative justices will long abide a mere prophylactic that limits
spending on political campaigns.721 In fact, Justice Thomas has already
declared that he views all campaign finance restrictions, including the base
limits on contributions, as unconstitutional.72 2
During the "Rehnquist Court" years, the conservative justices sought to
7 23
protect traditional moral values while also protecting economic liberty.
The Roberts Court conservatives have maintained the judicial support of
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
470 U. S.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.

Id.
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
Id.at 1462.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27, 38.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442.
Id. at 1441 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
480, 497 (1985)).
Id. at 1456-57.
Id. at 1441.
Id. at 1449 (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 739).
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449.
Id. at 1458.
Id. at 1462 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
COYLE, supra note 688, at 9-10.
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moral values, but they have further intensified the constitutional shielding of
economic liberty.7 24 In cases where the bolstering of traditional moral
values clashes with the protection of economic liberty, the Roberts Court
inevitably favors the latter.725 Two cases, in particular, involved businesses
that used arguably immoral expressive activities to garner economic profits,
and both cases held that the First Amendment protected the expression.726
Thus, the Court allowed the immoral, but profitable, activities to
continue.727 In United States v. Stevens,728 a federal statute prohibited
animal crush videos by criminalizing "the commercial creation, sale, or
possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty." 72 9 The Court held the
statute to be substantially overbroad on its face and therefore
unconstitutional. 7 30 The crush videos, the Court reasoned, did not fit into a
previously recognized low-value (or unprotected) category of free speech.73 1
Moreover, the government could not justify the creation of a new low-value
732
733
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, a state
category.
law prohibited "the sale or rental of 'violent video games' to minors." 73 4
Video games, the Court began, are a form of expression generally within the
compass of the First Amendment. 3
Then, as in Stevens, the Court
reasoned that this expression neither fell into a low-value category of
unprotected speech nor otherwise could be justifiably restricted.736 To be
sure, the Court did not emphasize in either Stevens or Brown that the
expressive activities were commercial and profitable, but at the same time,
the Court unquestionably understood that both cases involved economic
activities.

73 7

724. Id.
725.

See infra notes 729-38 and accompanying text.

726. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2010); Brown v. Entm't Merch., 131 S. Ct.
2729, 2735, 2741-42 (2011).
727. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464-65, 470.
728. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
729. Id at 464.
730. Id at 472, 478, 480.
731. Id. at 468.
732. Id. at 470.
733. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
734. Id at 2733.
735. Id
736. After discussing low-value categories, the Court reasoned that the state could not justify the
restriction under the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 2734, 2738, 2741.

737. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469, 81-82; Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735. Of note, in both Stevens and
Brown, the conservative bloc divided. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 463; Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732. In Agency
for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc 'y Int'l, Inc., a federal statute provided funding to
nongovernmental organizations to fight HIV/AIDS worldwide. Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for

Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (2013). The statute required organizations, however, to
agree that they opposed prostitution. Id. Thus, the case can be construed as pitting moral clarity
(opposing prostitution) against marketplace restrictions (attaching conditions to funding). Id. Again, the
Court held that the restrictions violated the first amendment. Id. at 2332.
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Moreover, it should be emphasized that the bolstering of moral clarity
does not necessarily conflict with economic liberty. 13 In the recent five-tofour decision, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,7 39 the conservative
block of justices were able to protect both traditional religious values and
corporate wealth. 7 40 The Court decided this case pursuant to a statute, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), rather than under the Free
Exercise Clause. 7 41 Regulations under the Affordable Care Act required
corporations to provide health insurance coverage to employees for various
types of contraceptives.742 In Hobby Lobby, closely held and for-profit
corporations argued that complicity in supplying certain types of
actually
claimed were
the corporations
contraceptives-which
abortifacients-violated their rights to religious freedom as protected under
RFRA.743 The government replied, in part, that corporations do not exercise
7
religion and therefore do not have rights under RFRA. 44 The Court
74 5
"[P]rotecting the freedisagreed and held in favor of the corporations.
wrote Alito for the
Lobby,"
Hobby
like
corporations
exercise rights of
own and control
who
humans
the
of
liberty
majority, "protects the religious
74 6
those companies."
Ultimately, the Roberts Court's stretching of the First Amendment to
protect economic liberty might be boundless, as demonstrated in the
purported free speech case, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. 747 decided in 2011.748
When pharmacies process prescriptions, they routinely record information
74 9
Data
such as the prescribing doctor, the patient, the dosage, and so forth.
mining businesses, like IMS Health Inc., buy this information, analyze it,
7 50
When
and sell or lease their reports to pharmaceutical manufacturers.
armed with this information, pharmaceutical salespersons are able to market
their drugs more effectively to doctors.' Vermont enacted a law tohaprevent
tw
752aur
The legislature had two
pharmacies from selling this information.
738.

739.
740.
741.
1488.
742.
(2010).
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.
752.

See infra notes 740-60 and accompanying text.

134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Id. at 2784-85.
Id; Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 163-164
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2784-85.
Id.
Id
Id. at 2768.
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
Id. at 2672.
Id. at 2659-60, 2667-68.
Id. at 2660, 2667-68.
Id. at 2659-60, 2667-68.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659.
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primary purposes: first, to protect the privacy of patients and doctors, and
second, to improve public health by, for example, encouraging doctors to
prescribe drugs in their patients' best interests rather than because of
effective pharmaceutical marketing.75 3 Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan, characterized the statute as a police
power regulation of the economic marketplace that did not trigger free
speech concerns.754 The Court disagreed. It reasoned that the statute raised
an unusual commercial speech issue.755 Commercial speech cases typically
involve advertising, and as the Court admitted, the statute in Sorrell did not
restrict advertising per se.756 Yet, the Court reasoned that the First
Amendment not only applied but also required "heightened judicial
scrutiny." 757
The Court then invalidated the statute pursuant to this
standard, which is more rigorous than the Central Hudson balancing test
ordinarily applied in commercial speech cases. 7 58 Therefore, in Sorrell, the
Roberts Court went even farther down the libertarian road by extending the
First Amendment to protect economic activities only tenuously connected to
759
expression.
IV. WHY WE SHOULD WORRY ABOUT DEMOCRACY, INC.

The Roberts Court conservatives have fully accepted and bolstered
Democracy, Inc. 760 Their expansive constitutional protection of economic
liberty harmonizes with neoliberal libertarianism and its underlying laissezfaire ideology. 76 1 In Citizens United and other cases, the conservative
justices interpreted the Constitution so that the private sphere subsumes the
public. 76 2 "Rational self-maximization, apropos in the private sphere,
753. Id. at 2668.
754. Id. at 2673-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer further reasoned that even if the statute was
construed as restricting speech, then at most, the Central Hudson test-an intermediate level of

scrutiny-should be applied. Id at 2673, 2679.
755. See id. at 2659-60, 2667-68.
756. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662-63, 2667.
757. Id. at 2664.
758.

Id at 2663-65. The Court reasoned that it would have invalidated the law even if it had

applied Central Hudson. Id. at 2667-68.
759. Interestingly, when the government is an employer, the Roberts Court protects the economic
marketplace and the sanctity of contract by allowing the government-employer to restrict the speech of

its employees. Borough of Duryea v. Guamieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2501 (2011) (limiting government
employee's First-Amendment right to petition the government); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425-

26 (2006) (limiting free-speech rights of government employees by distinguishing between speech as a
citizen and speech as an employee).
760. Feldman, supranote 18, at 346.
761. Jonathan Riehl, The Federalist Society and Movement Conservatism: How A Fractious
Coalition on the Right is Changing Constitutional Law and the Way We Talk and Think About It,
CHAPEL HILL, 45 (2007).

762. See generally McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 188; Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 688; Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 384-85.
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becomes the governing rule of conduct in the public sphere," as Milton
7 63
Friedman and other neoliberals have advocated.
For several decades now, political philosophers and social theorists
have warned that either excessive mixing of the public and private realms or
undue weakening of one realm at the expense of the other seriously
764
endangers the entire societal system, both the public and the private.76 A
common theme running among these diverse scholars, ranging from the
seminal neoconservative social theorist, Daniel Bell, to the renowned liberal
political philosopher, Jtirgen Habermas, is that the economic and political
7 65
The logic, structure, and culture
spheres must remain relatively separate.
of each sphere are distinct. 766

Thus, we need to be wary not only of

government unduly controlling the economy-as with a centralized or
planned economy-but also of economic institutions, particularly
In the words of
corporations, unduly controlling the government."6
Michael Walzer, "[w]hat democracy requires is that property should have no
political currency, that it shouldn't convert into anything like sovereignty,
768 When
authoritative command, sustained control over men and women."
economic concepts and reasoning are allowed to invade or colonize the
76 9
political realm, these theorists all argue that democracy is threatened.
Writing in the late 1970s, when corporations were beginning to assert
themselves in the democratic arena, Bell cautioned against the dangers of
7 70
Bell
mixing money and politics in a democratic-capitalist system.
the
social),
(or
techno-economic
the
realms:
three
into
society
divided
77
contribute
will
suggested,
he
cultural, and the political. ' The three realms,
763. Feldman, supra note 18, at 344; David Beetham, Liberal Democracy and the Limits of
Democratization,XL POL. STUD. 40, 50 (1992).

764. See infra notes 765-69.
765. See generally DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976);
JRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW
AND DEMOCRACY 322 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (discussing an ideal community); I JORGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF
SOCIETY 340-43 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION] (discussing how economic and administrative rationality can skew symbolic interactions).
Other theorists who have argued similarly include Hannah Arendt, Benjamin Barber, and Michael
Walzer. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION: A STUDY OF THE CENTRAL DILEMMAS FACING
MODERN MAN 27, 29 (1958) (arguing that political sphere needs to be purified of external concerns);
BARBER, supra note 502, at 239-46 (emphasizing that capitalism and democracy are not identical, so a
capitalist economy will not necessarily produce democracy); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 100-02 (1983); see HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 298, at 7475 (emphasizing need for "firewalls between the market and democracy").
766. BELL, supra note 765, at 10-13.
767. HAYEK, supra note 464, at 228-30.
768. WALZER, supra note 765, at 298.
769. See supranote 765 and accompanying text.
770. BELL, supra note 765, at xxx, 11.
771. Id. at xxx-xxxi, 10-13.
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to a stable society if they either remain separate or operate in ways that
reinforce each other.772 Early in the development of capitalism, a culture of
hard work, self-discipline, and self-denial--characterized by Max Weber as
the Protestant ethic-bolstered the capitalist economy by encouraging
individuals to devote themselves to employment in bureaucratically
organized workplaces.
By the second half of the twentieth century,
however, the three realms overlapped and intersected in ways that were not
mutually reinforcing; rather, they contradicted each other, causing societal
instability. 774 For instance, the capitalist economy required an ethos of
"work, delayed gratification, career orientation, [and] devotion to the
enterprise," 7 75 but the modernist culture imbued individuals with a
hedonistic desire for self-gratification.776 More to the point of this article,
tensions between the economic and political realms would also prove
problematic, according to Bell. 7 7 7 The operative principle of the capitalist
economy was efficiency, maximizing one's benefits while minimizing
costs,77 while the operative principle of the pluralist democratic polity was

equality, requiring that all individuals be "able to participate fully" as
citizens.779 If the two realms had remained distinct, each could successfully
fulfill its respective principle. 780 But the two realms were bleeding into each
other, Bell argued, thus producing discordance.78 ' Capitalism, aiming for
efficiency, relied on hierarchically structured bureaucratic organizations that
collided with the political desire for participatory equality.782 Meanwhile,
citizens pressed political demands that confounded equality and efficiency,
thus generating group conflict and societal instability. 7 83 And to be clear,
Bell perceived these dangers in the 1970s, in the midst of our consumers'
democracy.784 The emergence of Democracy, Inc., only exacerbates the
threat.78 s
The crucial point, whether one reads the neocon Bell or the liberal
Habermas, is that much is at stake-far more than who wins the next
772. Id at 36, 70, 79-80.
773. Id at 54-65; MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 52-54
(Talcott Parsons trans., 2d. ed. 1998).

774. BELL, supranote 765, at 11-16, 37, 71-72.
775.

Id. at xxv.

776. Id at xiv-xv, 72, 74-76.
777. Id. at xxx, 11.
778.
779.
780.
781.
782.

Id. at xxx-xxxi, 11.
BELL, supra note 765, at 11.
See infra notes 781-85 and accompanying text.
BELL, supra note 765, at 15.
Id. at xvi-xvii; NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 55, at 56.

783. BELL, supra note 765, at 23-25, 196-98.
784.

Feldman, supra note 18, at 337.

785. Id. at 338.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

2015]

327

election or what rate should be set for taxing corporations.786 The distinct
economic and democratic realms, with their respective logics and cultures,
7 As Habermas would
should not be permitted to intertwine excessively.
78 8
put it, our democratic system is suffering from a "legitimation crisis."
The democratic lawmaking process can retain its legitimacy only if citizens
If strategic
believe participatory equality structures the process.789
distort the
marketplace
economic
the
of
characteristic
manipulations
black-and-white
old
an
like
fades
legitimacy
then
democratic process,
photograph.79 0 Viewers might be able to discern the general shapes of what
remains, but the images are clouded and indistinct. 791 Unsurprisingly, then,
Democracy, Inc.-the extension of the corporate-dominated economic
marketplace into the political realm of pluralist democracy-threatens the
7 92
ongoing legitimacy and functionality of American democracy.
793
The
Start with the inveterate idea of American exceptionalism.
have
theorists
different
as
time,
over
varied
meaning of exceptionalism has
7 94
In the
discerned it in different aspects of the American experience.
be
could
Colonial Era, the Puritans of Massachusetts believed that America
7 95
Subsequently, early nineteenth century
God's "Citty vpon a Hill."
Americans viewed the nation as exceptional because it could last longer
than prior republics, which had succumbed to the seemingly natural rise and
fall of civilizations. 796 Indeed, at least until the Civil War, many Americans
797
In the
believed that the nation could escape the ravages of historical time.
mid-twentieth century, liberal political theorists saw American
798
In the late twentieth
exceptionalism in the nation's lack of a feudal past.
as rooted in the
exceptionalism
American
viewed
neoconservatives
century,

786. BELL, supra note 765, at 191-92; JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 92-93 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1975) [hereinafter LEGITIMATION CRISIS].
787. See BELL, supranote 765, at 15; LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supranote 786, at 46.
788. LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supranote 786, at 46.
789. Denise Vitale, Between Deliberative and Participatory Democracy: A Contribution on
Habermas, 32 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 739, 756 (2006).

790. Id. at 756-57.
791. HABERMAS, supra note 765, at 133.
792. ALLEN, supra note 14, at 1; LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supranote 786, at 92-93.
793. See generally Thomas A. McCarthy, From Modernism to Messianism: Liberal
Developmentalism and American Exceptionalism, 14 CONSTELLATIONS 3 (2007).
794. See infra notes 795-99 and accompanying text.

795. 1 John Winthrop, A Modell of ChristianCharity, reprintedin THE PURITANS 195, 199 (Perry
Miller & Thomas H. Johnson eds., 1963).
796.

G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-35, at 6-9

(1991).
797. DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 53 (1991).
798. JOHN G. GUNNELL, THE DESCENT OF POLITICAL THEORY: THE GENEALOGY OF AN
AMERICAN VOCATION 241 (1993).
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nation's principled commitment to democracy and individual rights, thus
799
justifying the American exercise of power in other countries.
But today, if the concept of American exceptionalism retains any
coherence, it lies in the historical persistence of our democratic culture.soo
Both the republican and pluralist democratic regimes were built on the
foundation of a democratic culture, which itself rested on the public
perception of a rough material equality-or, at least, the lack of gross
inequality, as found traditionally in European societies with entrenched
aristocracies.so0
Under republican democracy, the material equality
engendered by widespread land ownership contributed to a sense that
citizens were political equals with a shared commitment to the common
good. 802 Under pluralist democracy, widely shared middle class attitudes
generated a willingness to negotiate and compromise politically. 803 Because
America lacked an aristocratic class, citizens believed they were political
equals; they all might, at different times, be democratic winners and losers,
despite sharp disagreements over various policies. 80 4
In fact, the
significance of a persistent democratic culture grounded on perceptions of a
rough material equality-running from republican democracy through the
consumers' democracy-is evident in prior iterations of American
exceptionalism, such as the mid-twentieth century emphasis on the lack of a
feudal past. 05 Indeed, Alexis de Tocqueville emphasized material equality
as the unique key to understanding America. 80 6
Most important, then, Democracy, Inc., undermines the stability of our
democratic culture.80 7 Democracy, Inc., enfeebles belief in even the
roughest material equality because income and wealth are concentrated in
an incredibly small sliver of the population.sos From 1974 to 2007, the
share of national income going to the top-earning 0.1% of American
families increased "more than fourfold" (with adjustments for inflation) and
799. NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 55, at 64-68; Kenneth
Anderson, Goodbye To All That? A Requiem For Neoconservatism, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 277, 288-

90 (2007).
800.

Mark B. Rotenberg, America's Ambiguous Exceptionalism, 3 UNIV. ST. THOMAS L.J. 188,

190 (2005).
801. Id at 190-91.
802. See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 150-53 (tying widely available land to American
democracy).
803. See HARTZ, supranote 337, at 48-64 (emphasizing the importance of middle class attitudes).

804. See id
805. Id. at 48-60.
806. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 33-34 (Phillips Bradley eds., 1990).
807. See infra notes 808-817 and accompanying text.
808. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 298, at 16; see BARTELS, supra note 666, at 6-13 (detailing
income inequality); PIKETTY, supranote 12, at 24 (Figure: Income Inequality in the United States, 19102010); Alvaredo, supra note 487, at 4 (Table: Top 1 Percent Income Shared in the United States)

(graphing income shares through 2011).
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809
From
continued to remain disproportionately high in subsequent years.
one
top
to
the
went
gains
of
income
2009 to 2012, ninety-five percent
8 10
level
highest
its
In fact, American income inequality has reached
percent.
since the 1920s, just before the Great Depression and the collapse of the
republican democratic regime.811 We went from being a nation in which
most of its "income gains accrue to the bottom 90% of households (the
pattern for the economic expansion of the 1960s) to one in which more than
The level of income inequality-of
half go to the richest 1 percent ... .,,812
"economic polarization"813-has stretched to "historic scope." 8 14 Moreover,
and remarkably so, wealth inequality is even greater than income
inequality.815 As of 2007, the most affluent one percent of Americans
controlled thirty-five percent of the nation's wealth, while the top ten
8 16
percent controlled nearly seventy-five percent of the wealth!
Unquestionably, there has been no "trickle down" to the less
If anything, America has developed a "trickle up" system.
fortunate.81
A greater percentage of the income and wealth goes to the already-rich,
partly because it is neither going to the poor nor the shrinking middle
class. 8 19 Thomas Piketty, renowned French economist, has analyzed the
82 0
Piketty draws on historical
causes of increasing income inequality.
has increased because the
inequality
income
evidence to demonstrate that
rate of return on capital has exceeded the rate of growth of wages and
output. 8 2 1 That is, inequality has ballooned partly because a rentier class
82 2
has been accruing greater income than the working class. The rich can get
82 3
This phenomenon becomes more likely in
richer without working.
82 4
Additionally, income inequality has
economies."
growing
"slowly
825
"Supersalaries" are
"supersalaries."
of
advent
increased because of the
"extremely high remunerations at the summit of the wage hierarchy,

809. Id.
810. Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States
(Updated with 2012 PreliminaryEstimates), BERKELEY: U. OF CAL., DEPT. OF ECON. 1, 1 (2013).
811. PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 23-24; Saez, supra note 810, at 1-2; Stone, supranote 487, at 11.
812. HACKER & PIERSON, supranote 298, at 17.
813. PHILLIPS, supranote 276, at 127.
814. BARTELS, supra note 666, at 13.
815. STIGLITZ, supranote 12, at 2-3, 9-10; Stone, supra note 487, at 1, 12.
816. Stone, supranote 487, at 13.
817. HACKER & PIERSON, supranote 298, at 19.

818. Id. at 19-20.
819. STIGLITZ, supranote 12, at 8-11, 31-34.
820. See infra notes 821-29 and accompanying text.
821. PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 23, 571.

822.
823.
824.
825.

See id at 264.
See id.
Id.at25.
Id. at 298.
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particularly among top managers of large firms."82 6 In fact, Piketty shows
that in the United States, while capital gains have contributed significantly
(approximately one-third of the increase since 1980),827 the incredible pay
of top managers has primarily driven the rising inequality. 8 28 For instance,
CEO pay in the United States before the end of the Cold War stood at
approximately thirty times the average pay for workers, while today CEO
pay is nearly three hundred times that of workers. 8 29
Finally, Piketty emphasizes that skyrocketing income inequality does
not arise because of unalterable market forces or deterministic laws of
economics. 830
Rather, inequality is a product of "deeply political"
83
choices.
Government tax policies obviously influence wealth
distribution, but so do government policies regarding unions, executive pay,
and financial markets.8 32 Thus, as Piketty puts it, politics can serve as an
44
833
"amplifying mechanism" for increasing wealth.
Benefiting from
government policies, such as lower marginal tax rates, the rich use their
enhanced power to push for additional policies that would further increase
their wealth.834 To focus on one example, the "supersalaries" of top
managers are not related to marginal productivity or managerial
superiority. 83 5
From the perspective of the corporate employers, the
managers' salaries are economically irrational because the corporations do
not accrue proportional benefits. 83 6 CEOs and other corporate officials
might receive "supersalaries"-but not because they are truly "super
managers."
Of course, the managers act rationally, from their own
economic standpoint, by maximizing the satisfaction of their own selfinterest, granting themselves outrageous salaries and bonuses. 3 8 But did
not managers have the same incentives to maximize their own salaries in,
let's say, 1970 as in 2010? In fact, no: Politics changed the incentives.839
826.

PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 298.

827. Id at 294-96, 300.
828. Id at 291-92.
829. Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, CEO Pay Continues to Rise as Typical Workers Are Paid
Less, ISSUE BRIEF #380, (Econ. Policy Inst., Washington D.C.), June 12, 2014, at 2; PAUL KRUGMAN,
THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 142 (2007); STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 26.
830. PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 20-21, 353 (High returns on capital are "a historical fact, not a

logical necessity.").
831. Id. at 20; see KRUGMAN, supra note 829, at 7-9 (emphasizing politics).
832.
833.
834.

HACKER & PIERSON, supranote 298, at 47-70; see PHILLIPS, supranote 276, at 201.
PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 335.
Fukuyama, supra note 545, at 58; Jeffrey A. Winters & Benjamin 1. Page, Oligarchy in the

UnitedStates?, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 731, 731, 733 (2009).
835.
836.
837.
838.

KRUGMAN, supranote 829, at 142-44; see PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 298, 314-15, 333-34.
HACKER & PIERSON, supranote 298, at 62.
PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 298-302.
HACKER & PERSON, supra note 298, at 62-64.

839. See infra notes 840-843 and accompanying text.
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managers to pursue
tax policy now encourages
Government
"supersalaries." 8 40 In the 1970s, the top marginal tax rate was seventy
84 1
percent, but as of 2012, the top rate had dropped to thirty-five percent.
This change is partly because the rich have traditionally supported those
officials and candidates willing to cut the rates.842 In recent years, then,
managers have had strong financial incentives to maximize their own
3
remunerations. 84
Consequently, American income inequality has exploded partly because
8 44
It is Robin Hood in
neoliberal policies in Democracy, Inc., are extractive.
reverse: "[T]he riches accruing to the top have come at the expense of those
down below." 8 45 Gains in American productivity have not generated
846
The
increased income for the average American worker and household.
84 7
Brookings
a
recent
As
middle class, in particular, is being squeezed.
Institute Project reported: "Many American families whose incomes are not
low enough to officially place them in poverty live in economically
These families are of an expanding and
precarious situations." 8 4 8
9
"struggling lower-middle class." 84 Many of these families contain two
850
"Though not
wage-earners, but they still need to fight just to get by.
officially poor, these individuals and families experience limited economic
security. One major setback could thrust them into economic chaos."
852
This "trickle up". system, it should be emphasized, is not race neutral.
From 2000 to 2011, the income and wealth of African Americans and
Hispanics shrank more than that of other Americans. 8 53 To be sure,
economic inequality is not unique to the United States. 8 54 In many nations,

840. See PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 335.
841. Daniel Baneman and Jim Nunns, Income Tax Paid at Each Tax Rate, 1958-2009, TAX

POLICY CENTER 1, 3-4 (2012).
842. Winters & Page, supra note 834, at 739.
843. KRUGMAN, supra note 829, at 144; PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 335.
844. See HARVEY, supra note 49, at 29-31 (discussing extractive policies between countries).
845. STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 8 (emphasis in original); see PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 26
(explaining advancing inequality in capitalism).
846. See generally Ian Dew-Becker & Robert Gordon, Where Did the Productivity Growth Go?
Inflation Dynamics and the Distribution of Income, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 67

(2005).
847. Melissa S. Kearney & Benjamin H. Harris, A Dozen Facts About America's Struggling
Lower-Middle Class, BROOKINGS INST. HAMILTON PROJECT 1 (2013).

848.

Id. at 1.

849. Id.; see Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 1-2 (2011) (discussing expanding inequality).
850. Kearney & Harris, supra note 847, at 1, 3.

851. Id at 1.
852. Thomas W. Mitchell, Growing Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, 56 How. L.J. 849,
851, 857-61 (2012).
853.
854.

Id.; see PIKETTY, supra note 12, at 161 (noting relation between race and inequality).
TONKISS, supra note 548, at 163-65.
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the economically insecure and marginalized constitute more than fifty
percent of their respective populations.855 But the point of American
exceptionalism is that, historically, the United States has maintained enough
material equality to sustain a reasonable degree of political equality, which
in turn has sustained the democratic culture.856
Exorbitant material inequality threatens to crack the pillars of
democratic culture. 5 7
For instance, gross inequality in a pluralist
democratic regime will undermine commitment to the rule of law.
Individuals obey the law because they accept it as legitimate, fear the
punishment that might result from disobedience, or both. 5 Without the
perception of rough material equality, sustaining a sense of reasonable
political equality, government proclamations of legitimacy appear
bankrupt.86o Thus, citizens fear that "the political system is stacked" and
sc circumstances, people have little
mistrust their government. 861 IIn such
reason to obey the law other than fear. 86 2 We might call such a nation a
police state rather than a democracy.6 In fact, the prison population of the
United States is per capita larger than that of any other country, including
Russia. 864 It is approximately seven times greater than that of Europe as a
whole. 6 s The American prison population has catapulted in size by an
incredible seven hundred percent since 1970.866 Unsurprisingly, several
authors have linked neoliberal libertarian economic policies with the high
incarceration rates.867 More broadly, as Piketty puts it, extreme income and
855. Id.
856. Rotenberg, supra note 800, at 190, 198.
857.
858.

TONKISS, supranote 548, at 162-63.
Susan Burgess, Outing Courtesy: The Role ofRude Dissent in Rule ofLaw Systems, 38 LAW

& SOC. INQUIRY 206, 206-08 (2013).
859. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)
(arguing that the way to study the law is to place oneself in the position of the bad man, who cares only
about the application of force); Francis E. Lucey, S. J., Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their
Respective Contributionsto a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493, 527-28, 531

(1941) (criticizing Holmes for ignoring the importance of the good man).
860.

STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 167.

861. Id at 151.
862.
863.
864.

See Holmes, supra note 859, at 457; see also, Lucey, supra note 859, at 528.
STIGLITZ, supranote 12, at 157.
See ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1, 3, 5 (10 ed. 2013).

865.

See id

866. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, INFERNO: AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 2, 216 (2014);
WALMSLEY, supra note 864, at 3; The Prison Crisis, ACLU, available at https://www.aclu.org/files/a
ssets/massincarceration_problems.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
867. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS 31-32 (2011); NICOLA LACEY,
THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES
170 (2008); Loic WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL
INSECURITY 1-3 (2009); James Q. Whitman, The Free Market and the Prison, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1212,
1213 (2012) (Reviewing BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKET PUNISHMENT AND
THE MYTH OF NATURAL Order (2011)).
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wealth inequalities "radically undermine the meritocratic values on which
democratic societies are based." 86 8 Or in the words of Fukuyama, a "robust"
democracy cannot survive without a "healthy middle-class." 8 69
Democracy, Inc., further threatens the democratic culture because it
weakens the concept of national citizenship: the glue that binds individuals
together in a national polity.8 70 Gross income inequality, again, is a
87 1
contributing force as it diminishes individual allegiance to the nation.
Statistics demonstrate that the poor and lower-middle class become
72
disaffected and, consequently, less likely to vote than the wealthy. 8
87 3
Democracy, Inc., systematically "works to depoliticize its citizenry."
Without doubt, impoverished people are more apt to resort to crime and
violence.8 74 Moreover, multinational corporations care about profits, not
If anything, the national boundaries implicit in citizenship
borders. 7
represent obstacles to corporations, which prefer the free flow of
commercial goods to the most profitable markets, regardless of national
identities. 876 Corporate globalization threatens the very concept of a nation
state. Renowned corporate advocate and management consultant, Kenichi
Ohmae, has called the nation a "nostalgic fiction."s7 From his perspective,
"traditional nation states have become unnatural, even impossible, business
units in a global economy." 879 As Benjamin Barber aptly phrased it,
"[m]arkets abhor frontiers as nature abhors a vacuum." 880
Indeed,
nowadays, a corporate officer who sacrificed profit for the well-being of
any particular community-national or otherwise-would likely be deemed
untrustworthy, if not daft. 8 Milton Friedman has explicitly argued that the
only social responsibility of business is to maximize profits. 8 8 2 Any
8 83
corporate effort to do otherwise, in his opinion, would be immoral.

868.
869.
870.

PIKETTY, supranote 12, at 1.
Fukuyama, supranote 545, at 60.
WOLIN, supra note 14, at 43.

871. Id. at 269-70.
872. PHILLIPS, supra note 276, at 391; STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 167; Martha Albertson
Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits ofan AntidiscriminationApproach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV.

1713, 1716-18 (2012).
873.
874.
875.

POLITICS AND VISION, supra note 279, at 592.
HEDGES, supranote 309, at 9.
BARBER, supra note 502, at xviii.

876. Id. at 7-8.
877.

OHMAE, supra note 10, at 12.

878. Id.
879. Id at 5; see TONKISS, supranote 548, at 56-61 (discussing threat to nation states).
880. BARBER, supranote 502, at 13.
881. PHILLIPS, supranote 276, at 148, 412-13.
882. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility ofBusiness is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1970 [hereinafter The Social Responsibility ofBusiness].
883. Id; BAKAN, supra note 10, at 34.
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Friedman's views are not unusual. 84 Business consultant and professor,
Peter Drucker, declared, "' [i]f you find an executive who wants to take on
social responsibilities, . . . fire him. Fast.'"8

1

Corporations, in other words, care not one iota about promoting or
sustaining national citizenship. 886 Although the Supreme Court has deemed
corporations to be persons for constitutional purposes, any real person with
a corporation's single-minded desire for economic profit would be
diagnosed a psychopath. 8 7 Like a psychopath, corporations lack empathy
for others, are manipulative of others (in the corporate quest for profit), and
have delusions of grandeur (because their own profit or advantage is always
most important). 88 To the extent that citizens qua citizens survive in
Democracy, Inc., they exist primarily "to be manipulated, managed, and
intellectually massaged." 889 Corporations aim to produce consumers, not
democratic citizens.890
These consumers tend to be "self-interested,
exploitive, competitive, striving for inequalities, fearful of downward
mobility." 891 As Sheldon Wolin has explained Democracy, Inc., "[o]ne's
neighbor [is] either a rival or a useful object. As the world of capital
became steadily more enveloping and the claims of the political more
89 2
anachronistic, capital became the standard of the 'real,' the 'true world."'
In short, Democracy, Inc., endangers the democratic culture that has
893
sustained American government for more than two centuries.
An additional crucial insight that emerges from the discussions of Bell,
Habermas, and other scholars is that the public and private spheres operate
together as a system. 89 4 American society is a democratic-capitalist
system.

8 95

If one part of the system fails or becomes too weak, then the

884. See, e.g., id. at 35 (quoting Drucker).
885. Id.
886. See infra notes 887-893 and accompanying text.
887. See The Social Responsibility of Business, supra note 882, at 7 (explaining that "[a]
corporation is an artificial person" and that the corporate executive's sole duty is to its owners).
888. Id at 7-9 (emphasizing that a corporation's executive sole duty is to raise profits for the
corporation's owners or shareholders).
889. ALLEN, supra note 14, at 147.
890. See POLITICS AND VISION, supra note 279, at 597 (explaining that the capitalism creates an
"anti-democratic culture" and "deform[s] the worker qua worker [and] qua citizen.").

891. Id
892. Id
893. See id ("With the emergence of capitalism . . . its anti-democratic culture became steadily
more obvious").
894. David A. Bell, The "PublicSphere, " the State, and the World ofLaw in Eighteenth Century

France, 17 FR. HIST. STuD. 912, 914-16 (1992) [hereinafter The "Public Sphere] (discussing the work
of Habermas and his theory of a "public sphere constituted by private people").
895. Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEw LEFT REV. 5, 5 (2011)
("Democratic capitalism was fully established after the Second World War and only then in the
'Western' parts of the world. North America and Western Europe").
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Joseph Stiglitz, an economist, emphasizes
entire system is threatened. 9
that "the relationship between government and markets [should be viewed]
8 97
Thus, he adds that
as complementary, both working in partnership."
reinforce each
they
and
related,
"failures in politics and economics are
89 8
Daron Acemoglu, an economist, and James A. Robinson, a
other."
political scientist and economist, jointly describe a "strong synergy between
899
They explain that if either economic
economic and political institutions."
they are not inclusive-then the
skewed-if
are
institutions
or political
900
In any democratic-capitalist
unstable.
entire societal system becomes
tensions or conflicts
potential
system, one should recognize, there are
90 1
The goals of actors in the
between the public and private spheres.
90 2
According to an
respective spheres do not necessarily harmonize.
apocryphal quote from Louis Brandeis: "We may have democracy, or we
may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can't have
have
both." 9 0 3 Possibly, then, in the United States, these potential tensions
904
Yet,
system.
created a weakness, an instability, in the political-economic
905
tense
The
in the alternative, the tensions might engender strength.
balance between the public and private spheres might well have created the
flexibility that has enabled the American system to last more than two
906
centuries despite enormous social and cultural changes.
Because the public and private spheres are interconnected, if the private
sphere subsumes the public realm, the entire democratic-capitalist system
will be threatened.907 If Democracy, Inc., and its neoliberal libertarian
ideology undermine democratic culture-as seems to be happening-if the

896.

See Fred Block & Peter Evans, The State and the Economy, in THE HANDBOOK OF

ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 505, 505-06 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2005).
897. STIGLITZ, supranote 10, at xiii.
898. See id at xiii, I (describing that he "studied the failures of both markets and government, and
was not so naive as to think that government could remedy every market failure. Neither was [he] so
foolish as to believe that markets by themselves solved every societal problem . . .").
899. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER,
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 81 (2012).

900.

See id at 3-4, 82.

901. See KUHNER, supra note 12, at 24 (discussing how citizens had to choose between
government and their trade).
902. Samuel BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, A COOPERATIVE SPECIES: HUMAN RECIPROCITY AND
ITS EVOLUTION 3-7 (2011); KUHNER, supra note 12, at 24.
903. Peter Scott Campbell, Democracy v. ConcentratedWealth: In Search of a Louis D. Brandeis

Quote, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 251, 256 (2013).
904. See id. at 254 (explaining how Brandeis's concerns actually occurred in the United States).
905. See Stephen M. Feldman, An Interpretation of Max Weber's Theory of Law: Metaphysics,
Economics, and the Iron Cage of Constitutional Law, 16 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 205, 216 (1991)
[hereinafter An InterpretationofMax Weber's Theory ofLaw].
906. A Weberian perspective suggests that systemic tensions can create strength rather than

weakness. See id. at 216, 241-48 (1991).
907.

See infra notes 908-22 and accompanying text.
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people lose their faith in democratic government-as appears to be
occurring-then not only American democracy but also American
capitalism will be endangered. 908 Government unequivocally needs the
funding supplied from a functioning economic marketplace. 909 The
government cannot perform any task, whether road building, firefighting,
public education, or anything else, without revenue derived from profitdriven economic actors. 9 10

But contrary to laissez-faire dreaming, the

economy needs a functioning democratic government. 911 The government
supports capitalism in multiple ways. 912 Among its many functions,
government regulates the money supply and credit; it supplies rules for
contractual agreements; it educates and trains potential workers; it regulates
land and resource use; it builds and maintains roads, seaports, and
airports.913 In short, government provides "the soft and hard infrastructure"
that facilitates economic transactions. 9 14
Without government
infrastructure, economic transactions might be possible, but transaction
costs would become astronomical. 9 15 Dani Rodrik, an economist, reiterates
the basic point: "Markets and states are complements .. . .96
But Rodrik
goes further, explaining that national markets depend on national
government: "If you want more and better markets, you have to have more
(and better) governance. Markets work best not where states are weakest,
but where they are strong." 917 In other words, a strong democratic
government does more than provide infrastructure. 918 Government can
protect competition in the marketplace by, for instance, enacting and
enforcing antitrust laws.919 Government can also correct for the inequities
that naturally flow from capitalist incentives by, for instance, providing
sustenance during times of unemployment.920 Finally, government can
nurture the culture that sustains a continuing democracy by restricting the

908.

STIGLITZ, supranote 10, at 53.

909. Block & Evans, supra note 896, at 505-06.
910. See id. at 505 (explaining that "states ... depend on the economy for the flows of revenue
that finance state activity") (internal citations omitted).
911. See id. at 507 ("[M]arkets ... depend upon state power and institutional structures to achieve
their ends").
912.

KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION xxvi-xxvii (1944).

913. Id. at xxv-xxvii.
914. STIGLITZ, supranote 12, at 66, 116; ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 899, at 76.
915. RODRIK, supranote 12, at 14-16.
916. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
917. Id at xviii.
918. See HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 10, at 114-17 (explaining how government helps
sustain capitalism).
919. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer (2015).
920. HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 10, at 114-16 (discussing how employment improved
throughout the early 1900's).

2015]

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

337

In sum, big
translation of economic power into political power.921
multinational corporations need big democratic governments to maintain a
healthy, systemic balance.922
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutional framers clearly understood the need to conceptualize
separate public and private spheres and to recognize their systemic
interrelationship.923 In fact, the framers feared for the nation's future when
they arrived in Philadelphia for the convention. 9 24 From their perspective,
national survival depended on their successful drafting (and the subsequent
ratification) of a constitution that would maintain a healthy balance between
the public and private spheres. 92 5 The framers became pragmatic realists
during the 1780s because, in their eyes, state governments had turned
corrupt. 9 2 6 The framers learned that most people pursued their own passions
and interests, whether acting in the economic marketplace or in
governmental affairs. 92 7 The people and their elected officials could not be
When
trusted to act virtuously in pursuit of the common good.92 8
individuals enjoy liberty, many, if not most of them, will seek to satisfy
their own self-interest. 929 If they contemplate government affairs at all, it is
only to increase their own profits or wealth.930 In other words, the framers
had seen during the 1780s, to their great disappointment, an alarming

921. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1437-38 (explaining that the BCRA of 2002 and the 1976
FECA Amendments prevent wealthy donors from contributing an excessive amount of money to both
individual candidates or a political party).
922. See SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 12, at xiii, 137-38 (recommending when government
should regulate, including for fairness and equity).
923. James Madison, THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (emphasizing the importance of "secur[ing] [both]
the public good and private rights . . .").
924. See generally James Madison, Vices of the PoliticalSystem of the United States, reprinted in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 69 (1999); 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 18 (1911) (Edmund Randolph worrying about national survival).
925. Madison, supra note 924, at 41, 43-44; see Maier, supra note 10, at 81-82 (emphasizing the
founders' interest in both private economic activity and the public wealth).
926. See, e.g., FARRAND, supra note 924, at 376 (Alexander Hamilton emphasizing realistic
approach); 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 278 (1937) (John
Dickinson emphasizing experience).
927. See WOOD, supra note 21, at 409-13; see, e.g., James Wilson, In the Pennsylvania
Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787 138, 141-42 (1966) (lamenting licentiousness of citizens and government problems).
928. See BEEMAN, supra note 21, at 7 (explaining how politicians would use "the soldiers'
discontents to further their own plans . . .").
929. MCDONALD, supra note 21, at 179 ("[M]en, most of the time, would act out of motives of
self interest rather than of the public interest").
930. See BEEMAN, supra note 21, at 10 (describing member of the Continental Congress, Robert
Morris, as "a man whose single-minded devotion to the pursuit of wealth and power led to business
practices that were self-serving and dishonest").
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number of state citizens act like rational self-maximizers. 93 1 And the
framers recognized that this type of unchecked self-interested action could
not be sustained. 93 2 If the people continued their unchecked pursuit of selfinterest in the public sphere, the American experiment would end in
failure. 9 33
History subsequent to the framing suggests the framers' perspicacity.934
In fact, the history of the early twentieth century suggests that the United
States in the early twenty-first century is approaching a crisis-one of both
democracy and capitalism.

9 35

Without doubt, the parallels between these

two eras, separated by a century, are alarming, as numerous scholars in
disciplines as diverse as economics, political science, history, anthropology,
and economic sociology have recognized.936 Laissez-faire ideology grew
especially strong during the early twentieth century, 9 37 and neoliberal
libertarianism, like laissez-faire on steroids, has flexed its muscles in the
early twenty-first century. 93 8 During both eras, the strength of laissez-faire
ideology generated strong opposition to social welfare laws and other
government policies that might impinge on the economic marketplace.939
Thus, during these two time periods, the dream of laissez-faire moved
closer to reality-though, during both times, businesses continued to seek
and to accept government favors. 940 Predictably, then, during both the early
twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries, economic inequality increased
931.

Madison, supra note 924, at 43.

932. See id at 41, 43-44.
933.

See BEEMAN, supra note 21, at 7, 18; MCDONALD, supra note 21, at 94-96, 138-42, 177-79;

NEDELSKY, supra note 21, at 30, 125-26; WOOD, supranote 21, at 403-04, "Madison's political thought
was characterized by an often agonized effort to find a working balance between the rights of property
and republican principles." NEDELSKY, supra note 21, at 12.
934. See infra notes 935-48 and accompanying text.
935. See supraPart II.B.2.
936. See HARVEY, supra note 49, at 153, 188-89 (anthropologist); RODRIK, supra note 12, at xvi
(economist); POLANYI, supra note 912, at vii, xiv (economist); POLANYI, supra note 912, at xxii-xxiii
(economic sociologist); see CHRISTOPHER CLARK, THE SLEEPWALKERS: How EUROPE WENT TO WAR IN
1914 xxvii-xxviii (2012) (historian paralleling political situations of early-twentieth and early-twentyfirst centuries); FRIEDEN, supra note 10, at xv-xvii, 391 (political scientist paralleling globalization of
early-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries); MARGARET MACMILLAN, THE WAR THAT ENDED
PEACE: THE ROAD TO 1914 xxxii (2013) (historian doing same).
937. See, e.g., Warren G. Harding, The Return to Normalcy, 67 CONG. REC. 169 (daily ed. April
12, 1921); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND
WAR, 1929-1945 33 (1999) (quoting Calvin Coolidge).
938. See, e.g., WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC 30 (1925) (criticizing voters as too
manipulable).
939. Karl Polanyi referred to this connection as a "double movement." POLANYI, supra note 912,
at 79, 136, 223; see POLANYI, supra note 912, at xxviii-xxix (explaining double-movement thesis). On
the tension between Progressivism and laissez faire, see MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916 89-90 (1988); Charles W. McCurdy, The
"Liberty of Contract" Regime in American Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 162-63
(Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998).
940. See supraPart Ill.A
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to striking proportions. 94 1 And, to be clear, gross inequality not only
weakened democracy but also undermined the operation of the economic
marketplace-witness the Great Depression of the twentieth century and the
Great Recession of the twenty-first century.942 When Americans near the
bottom of the income scale are so poor that they lack money to spend on
consumer goods, then overall demand is reduced and unemployment
rises. 9 43 The rich are likely to funnel much of their extra wealth into
financial investments rather than spending it on additional consumer goods;
such investments, therefore, often do not boost demand, production, or
employment. 9 44 Moreover, during times of high inequality, the government
is unlikely to invest adequately in hard and soft infrastructure.94 5 Thus, for
The
instance, roads and bridges deteriorate and go unrepaired. 94 6
government is likely to reduce its support of scientific and social-scientific
research-the type of support that helped create the Cold War cities of
knowledge.9 47 Overall, gross inequality undermines social cohesion, and
social cohesion is a prerequisite for a well-tuned national economy. 94 8
The predominance of laissez-faire ideology during both the early
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries also generated persistent and overt
attacks on democratic processes and government. 9 49
For instance,
nowadays, it is almost trite to criticize Congress as dysfunctional.9 50 Yet,
the extreme party polarization that has crippled Congress in recent years
eerily mirrors Karl Polanyi's 1944 description of European interwar
democracies: "A clash of group interests" had paralyzed national
institutions, thus creating "an immediate peril to society." 9 5 1 Moreover,
rhetorical attacks on democracy can have serious consequences, as
demonstrated by the early twentieth century, when numerous democratic
941. STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 106; Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality: Evidence and Policy
Implications, Arrow Lecture at Stanford University (Jan. 2013) (containing graphs illustrating changing
degrees of income inequality); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United

States, 1913-1998, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1-2 (2003) (discussing income inequality).
942.
inequality
943.
944.
945.

STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 106; see HARVEY, supra note 49, at 188-89 (explaining how
can lead to a "structural crisis").
STIGLITZ, supranote 12, at 288-89.
HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 10, at 102-04; STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 106-08.
See STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 116-17.

946. See id.
947. See id. at 115-17; White House Council of Economic Advisers, Supporting Research and
Development to Promote Economic Growth: The Federal Government's Role (1995) (discussing how
federal investment on research benefits the economy).
948. STIGLITZ, supranote 10, at 219.

949. See supra Parts 1, I11.A.
950. Jonathan Allen and John Bresnahan, Dysfunctional Congress 'Worse' than Ever?,
POLITICO.COM (June 30,2011, 4:30 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/58076.html.
951. POLANYI, supra note 912, at 244. For discussions of polarization, see NEOCONSERVATIVE
POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 55, at 43-45; MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE
WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 37-39 (2005).
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governments in Europe collapsed amidst calls for less interference with the
marketplace.952 In the United States, many conservatives today attack
democratic participation in manners that echo the early twentieth century.953
During both eras, voting restrictions were justified as legitimate efforts to
"preserve the purity of the ballot box," 95 4 but the effect is to exclude certain
The
societal groups, such as the poor and racial minorities. 955
disfranchisement laws tend to discriminate especially against those lacking
"time, money, and knowledge of bureaucracy." 9 56 In recent years, more
than thirty states have enacted laws restricting voting. 9 57 For instance, the
Voter Information Verification Act of North Carolina not only requires
voters to present government-issued photo identification at the polls, but
also shortens the early voting period, ends pre-registration for sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds, and eliminates same-day voter registration.95 8 Under
the Texas Voter Identification law, an individual who presents a concealed
handgun permit can vote, but an individual with a student photo ID
cannot. 9 59 A Pew Center study discovered that "at least 51 million eligible
U.S. citizens are unregistered, or more than 24 percent of the eligible
population." 960 For purposes of comparison, in Canada, more than ninetythree percent of eligible voters are registered.96'
To be clear, many
American citizens do not participate because they are purposefully
discouraged or prevented from doing so, not because they are apathetic. 962
Significantly, the Roberts Court, which claimed in Citizens United to be
concerned with protecting the democratic process, facilitated the passage of
these disfranchisement laws by invalidating a key provision of the Voting
Rights Act.963 Even when people can vote, it should be noted, the political

952. For discussions of the collapse of many European interwar democracies, see FRIEDEN, supra
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gerrymandering of legislative districts can skew voting power by creating
964
safe districts.
In sum, the history of the early twentieth and early twenty-first centuries
supports those social and political theorists who reason that undue or
improper mixing of the public and private spheres can undermine the entire
societal system.965 More specifically, when one sphere undermines the
operation of the other, or when either the private or public spheres languish,
9 66
Utopian dreams of
the entire democratic-capitalist system is threatened.
an unregulated laissez-faire marketplace can weaken democratic
governments.967 An inverse relationship exists: As demands for economic
rationalism and laissez-faire increase, confidence in government
968
Yet, if the government or the economy becomes too weak, the
decreases9.
entire system can collapse. 9 69 A pristine self-sufficient and self-regulating
970
Liberty
market economy has never existed and is literally impossible.
97 1
cannot long continue in one sphere if it does not exist in the other.
Despite laissez-faire ideology, the diminishment and ultimate destruction of
972
To be sure, democratic
democracy would be bad for business-very bad.
973
a
laissez-faire utopia is
of
allure
The
politics is messy and frustrating.
strong. But if the laissez-faire dream were realized-if the economic
marketplace determined all, if democratic governance and politics were
largely eliminated-then we would find ourselves in a dystopia, not a
-

utopia.
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